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INTERNATIONAL

UNITED STATES OFFERS AID TO THIRD WORLD FOR EXPANSIONARY PURPOSES

Minsk SOVETSKAYA BELORUSSIYA in Russian 13 Nov 81 p 3

[Article by V. Pozdnyak: "The Other Side of 'Unselfish' Aid"]

[Text] American aid to the developed countries, which is publicized by bourgeois propaganda, has always served the purposes of U.S. imperialist policy and is one of the most frequently used instruments for economic expansion and the exertion of pressure on governments which displease Washington.

It is easy to see that the majority of reactionary coups in the liberated countries, accomplished with the covert or overt assistance of the United States, began with the creation of economic difficulties for progressive governments, the destabilization of the economy and, finally, the destabilization of political structures, which paved the way for the usurpation of authority by ultra-rightist groups with pro-fascist leanings. Chile is a vivid example of this.

The significance and scales of American economic aid to the developing countries are not in any way as great as U.S. propaganda organs depict them. According to the calculations of American economist William Cline, the United States spends only around 0.2 percent of its gross national product on economic aid and ranks 15th among the leading capitalist states offering this kind of aid. The lion's share of the aid is sent to such pro-American countries as Israel, Egypt and South Korea and to anti-people dictatorships in Latin America.

It would be hard to determine where "pure" economic aid ends and military aid begins. It is certainly obvious that the latter's position is far from negligible. In any case, no one could convince the people of El Salvador that the United States is giving them "economic aid" by assisting a "government friendly to the United States."

As the world's foremost exporter of weapons, the United States annually increases its direct military support of official pro-American regimes and illegal terrorist groups. In fiscal year 1982, for example, the United States plans to give 213 million dollars in military aid to countries in Latin America. Of course, the bloody fascist dictatorships in El Salvador, Guatemala, Chile and Paraguay head the list of "clients."

At the same time, U.S. aid intended directly for the economic development of young states is constantly decreasing. In comparison to the 1960's, again according to

Cline, U.S. aid to foreign states has decreased 40 percent in real prices. The Reagan Administration, which is economizing on everything that offers American monopolies no economic or political advantages, intends to continue this reduction. A cut of 26 percent in U.S. aid to foreign states has been announced, meaning that it will decrease from 8 billion dollars a year to approximately 6 billion. Under the conditions of the mass militarization of the American economy, cuts in various domestic social programs and a number of international programs are expected to provide more opportunities for the dramatic augmentation of military spending.

American financial and economic aid to the young states is nothing other than one of the channels for the export of capital. It takes two forms--the form of government subsidies, loans and credit, and the form of financing by private monopolistic capital (so-called "private" aid). The second form far outweighs the first, essentially because of its overtly exploitative nature. It is also indicative that non-privileged forms of capital export have been developing at a rapid rate in recent years. According to OECD data, these account for more than half of all the funds offered to the developing countries. Statements by American officials indicate that this tendency will continue. In other words, preference will be given to ordinary credit, particularly by monopolistic capital. American Vice-President G. Bush acknowledged in a recent speech that "the investments of American capital are growing dramatically again." Therefore, philanthropy and sentiment are being tossed aside and--long live profit! This is a concise description of the present U.S. position in this sphere.

The American press has reported that the United States is 50-percent dependent on imports of 24 out of 32 "strategic" raw materials. This is the reason for its constant interest in preserving its influence in the developing countries, many of which are rich in mineral resources. It is to these countries that most state and private capital is sent in the form of various types of aid.

The experience of recent years testifies that U.S. aid to the liberated states is not having a positive effect on their economic development and is serving the purposes of neocolonial enslavement and the economic expansion of imperialism. Inflation, the rising prices of industrial commodities and the fact that a large portion of the funds allocated to the developing countries must be returned in the form of repayment for credit and loans virtually nullify this "aid." It is also significant that much of the "aid" is of a "conditional" nature, meaning that credit is made conditional on purchases of equipment and commodities from the United States, which gives monopolies a chance to raise their prices to above the world average. The combination of all this seems more like covert robbery.

In general, American economic "aid" to foreign states is actually intended to, in addition to serving economic purposes, support existing pro-American regimes, regardless of how inhumane they might be, finance circles which might seize power with the assistance of the United States, and organize and reinforce reactionary forces, which are also expected to nullify the gains of the people in the liberated countries in the future. As we can see, the goal is the same--to keep the developing countries within the sphere of imperialist domination.

The main feature of the Reagan Administration's foreign policy from the very first days of its existence has been the examination of world problems through the prism

of East-West relations. Here, as we know, Washington views everything simply as a "total Soviet threat" and nothing more. In accordance with strategic aims, the specific principles governing U.S. relations with groups of countries and entire regions emphasize struggle against the "communist menace."

The global crusade against communism, declared by the United States, is reflected in Washington's approach to its relations with the developing countries. A WASHINGTON POST article related the views of U.S. Secretary of State A. Haig, according to whom the United States and its allies "must show the countries of the Third World that their hopes for development can best be realized if they cooperate with the Western countries, and not with the Soviet Union." Apparently, we can expect the opinion of this high-level spokesman for the American administration to influence the motives for the allocation of American aid. At the same time, Washington has made the ridiculous demand that the USSR "modify its behavior" with regard to the developing countries.

Obviously, the United States is gambling with the wrong card. The USSR has demonstrated numerous times that it is futile to speak to it in the language of threats. As for Washington's proposed "rules of conduct" with regard to the young states, Comrade L. I. Brezhnev, general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee and chairman of the USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium, unequivocally said: "If these are some kind of 'rules' which will perpetuate the imperialist robbery and authoritarian treatment of these states, the creation of 'spheres of influence' and so forth, we will certainly never agree to them." As for the United States' futile attempts to preserve its economic dominion in the developing countries by all means available, as the accountability report of the CPSU Central Committee to the 26th congress noted, "the reorganization of international economic relations on a democratic basis and on the principles of equality is historically justified.... We are prepared to assist, and are now assisting, in the establishment of fair international economic relations."

The position of the USSR and other socialist states on this matter is clear and unequivocal; it is truly an example of mutually beneficial cooperation with the developing countries, which are beginning to realize who their real friends are. No "unselfish" U.S. aid can replace the establishment of a just international economic order, which is dictated by the realities of our time, or guarantee the thorough and balanced development of the liberated countries on the road to progress. In the same way, this "aid" cannot camouflage the actual essence of imperialist policy toward the developing countries or slow down the objective processes of their economic and social development.

8588

CSO: 1807/20

INTERNATIONAL

UNITED STATES CHARGES OF SOVIET USE OF CHEMICAL WEAPONS UNFOUNDED

Kiev RABOCHAYA GAZETA in Russian 24 Nov 81 p 3

[Article by V. Sednev: "The Pentagon's Poisonous Lie; Imperialism Unmasked"]

[Text] The campaign connected with the "Soviet military threat" invented by bourgeois propaganda is still going on in the West, especially in the United States. Members of the top echelons of power in Washington recently joined this campaign. One forgery after another has been produced. A prominent place among these is occupied by the "authentic reports" of "the use of toxic substances by the Soviet Union and Vietnam" in Afghanistan and Kampuchea. This slanderous campaign is supposed to make the world forget about the American aggressors' monstrous crimes in Southeast Asia.

Uncontrollable vomiting, paralysis, severe headaches, a lack of coordination, liver and gastrointestinal disorders, the appearance of a rash and malignant skin lesions--they will experience all of this later, much later. But at that time, at the height of the Vietnam War, when the American ultra-reactionaries were demanding "Return Vietnam to the stone age" and "Drop the atom bomb on the gooks," people in the United States were not overly concerned with what was later to be called, in the language of legal documents, "the devastating effect of chemical substances on people and the environment."

The poisonous boomerang hurled by the strong hand of the unknowing and the slight suspicions of the GI's turned into a real tragedy years later for many Americans who are paying today with their health and the health of their children for the crimes of the Pentagon generals.

According to the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, during the years since the end of the war in Vietnam, 1,200 former flyers who flew combat missions to disperse various toxic substances and 60,000 people who were then fighting in the contaminated area have informed the Veterans' Administration of various health complaints.

American medical specialists have confirmed that the illnesses, including cancer and neuropsychological disorders, of participants in the dirty war in Vietnam are directly related to the harmful effects of toxic chemical substances.

The chief element of the chemical warfare in Vietnam was dioxin. Studies by American, Vietnamese, Australian and Swiss physicians and by chemists from other countries have established that a minimum dose of dioxin can have a pernicious effect on the health of the individual and his future children. According to a TIMES survey of American veterans, 538 of the soldiers who came into contact with chemicals in Vietnam have 77 crippled children. The children of many veterans were born deaf, blind or with other defects. Each day the number of victims rises.

In a recent statement, U.S. Secretary of Health and Human Services R. Schweiker had to admit that the United States had used chemical weapons in Vietnam. This was the first acknowledgement on the government level that more than 45 million liters of chemical substances had been dropped on the territory of Vietnam by planes during the war. Although these data are obviously understated, even they attest to the grand scales of the chemical warfare.

History has rarely seen barbarism of these proportions. Only the fascists resorted to this kind of fanatical cruelty. The American misanthropes resolved to annihilate all life in Vietnam. According to far from complete data, the SRV memorandum distributed to the Disarmament Commission on 20 March 1980 notes, more than 100,000 tons of chemical substances were "used" by the United States just in South Vietnam during the war. As a result, 43 percent of the cultivated land and 44 percent of the forests suffered. Around 70 percent of the coconut groves and 150,000 hectares of vegetation were destroyed. As the document points out, "many huge, previously cultivated fields and forested areas turned into semidesert zones.... The specific makeup and number of animals have changed, and the most harmful insects and animals are thriving, as a result of which dangerous tropical diseases are widespread." More than 2 million Vietnamese were victims of the chemical warfare; 3,500 of them died immediately and the rest have already been suffering the effects of the poison for many years.

The poisoners' victims included not only thousands of Vietnamese old people, women and children, but also a large number of American Army personnel, who had no idea of the pernicious effects of contact with these chemicals.

The authorities' forced admissions literally shocked the 2.5 million soldiers who had fought in Vietnam. They demanded thorough and free medical examinations for all former servicemen who exhibit the symptoms of these disorders. Legal and justified claims for damages to compensate the victims of these inhuman actions for their losses are being submitted to the U.S. Government.

There is no doubt that the American leaders were kept quite well informed of the investigations and findings of the special task force set up by the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services to study the effects of the toxic chemicals used in Vietnam, as well as of the incidence of "chemical" diseases in American veterans of this war. There is also no doubt that the Pentagon knew that the news of the unscrupulous actions of the American military establishment would evoke a negative reaction in the country and intense indignation throughout the world. This is why people in Washington quickly found a scapegoat and presented the world public with a veritable flood of slanderous and irresponsible statements about some kind of Soviet "involvement" in the use of chemical and biological weapons in Southeast Asia and Afghanistan.

American officials are obviously spreading this unfounded lie about the Soviet Union in an attempt to whitewash the American military establishment and its filthy activity. In this way, they are trying to make the average American forget about the threat posed by the use of chemical weapons. By lulling the American public with talk about the possibility of "limited" nuclear war with the extensive use of chemical and neutron weapons, the irresponsible politicians hope to deflect the wave of protest, which is growing with each day, against the criminal preparations for a new world war.

Some facts about the Pentagon's active preparations for chemical warfare were recently divulged by the weekly UNITY. According to its data, the United States has accumulated 50,000 tons of VZ, a strong toxic gas. Around 1 million barrels of another toxic substance, zarine, can be found on a military base in Utah. This is also where the VH nerve gas, three times as strong as zarine, is stored. Besides this, the weekly reported, around 1,000 so-called "wet-eye" bombs, filled with zarine, have already been produced in the United States.

Even if a lie is elevated to the status of government policy, it is still a lie. Washington's propaganda bubble burst when it came into contact with reality. But Washington's criminal intrigues are already capable of extinguishing hundreds of millions of human lives, evoking global catastrophe and ending the very existence of human civilization. All people of good will are demanding that these obsessive maniacs be stopped and that their criminal plans be frustrated. They have been joined in their loud protests by the Americans who became the victims of these inhuman weapons and have felt the horrifying aftereffects of their use literally on their own skin. Now they have gained awareness. But the price of this awareness is too high. More and more people in the West are beginning to realize this. The powerful current of the movement for a ban on chemical weapons is now joining the mainstream of struggle against the danger of a new world war.

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INTERNATIONAL

EXCERPTS FROM ARBATOV'S BOOK 'THE SOVIET POINT OF VIEW'

Vilnius KOMMUNIST in Russian No 9, Sep 81 pp 77-87

[Interview with Academician Georgiy Arkad'yevich Arbatov, director of the Institute of U.S. and Canada Studies of the USSR Academy of Sciences, member of the CPSU Central Committee and deputy of the USSR Supreme Soviet, by Dutch journalist W. Oltmans; at various times during 1979 and 1980, place of interview not specified; excerpted from interview in book form, published in the FRG and Holland in 1981]

[Text] A book of interviews with prominent Soviet expert on international affairs and public spokesman, Academician Georgiy Arkad'yevich Arbatov, director of the Institute of U.S. and Canada Studies of the USSR Academy of Sciences, member of the CPSU Central Committee and deputy of the USSR Supreme Soviet, was published in the FRG and Holland in March 1981. The book contains transcripts of his talks with Dutch journalist W. Oltmans throughout 1979 and 1980. Excerpts from the book are printed below with the author's permission.

[Question] The 1970's were the decade of detente. Will the 1980's be the decade of the second cold war?

[Answer] We must not be such fatalists that we immediately give up on an entire decade. It is true, however, that the international situation as a whole has deteriorated seriously. It seemed just recently that the world had found an escape from the cold war impasse and that the policy of detente had become the normal state of affairs. Now, however, some view detente as only a temporary deviation, to be followed by an unavoidable return to tension, hostility and confrontation--in short, to what was considered the normal state of affairs during the cold war era.

[Question] What do you consider the normal state of affairs to be?

[Answer] I would very much like to say with absolute certainty that the relaxation of international tension, the continuous development of cooperation and progress in arms control constitute the normal state of affairs and that we are now experiencing a deviation from this norm. But before we talk about this, let us agree on what we mean by "normal."

If we use the term "normal" to mean the natural state--for example, when we speak of "normal" body temperature, we mean that the body is healthy and that there is no

threat to this health--then there is no question that the normal state of affairs is detente, and not cold war.

But the "normal" could also be the "usual"--the state that can be maintained without any special effort.

For example, it is "normal" for a cork to float. It takes effort to submerge it or lift it up in the air; as soon as this effort is discontinued, the cork returns to its normal initial state. In this sense, detente, unfortunately, is still not the normal state of international relations. Its maintenance still requires special effort, whereas tension can already be engendered by mere inactivity.

[Question] In other words, detente ran into trouble when the efforts that had been made to maintain it turned out to be inadequate?

[Answer] No, not entirely. It is true that some people did more for detente than others, but the difficulties here were engendered by more than just someone's failure to act. A truly decisive role was played by the desperate opposition of forces which regarded detente as a dangerous and hostile heresy from the very beginning. The radical change in U.S. foreign policy at the end of the 1970's and the beginning of the 1980's dealt a particularly severe blow to detente.

[Question] That statement would make the Americans indignant because they are convinced that Afghanistan was the main reason for the present deterioration of relations.

[Answer] It is no secret that the West responded to our policy toward Afghanistan with an entire hurricane of slander. But political opinions must be based on facts.

The official American argument that the events in Afghanistan were the reason for the present deterioration of relations will not stand up to criticism because the fundamental decisions which constitute the basis of the new U.S. policy and which are regarded in the USSR as a colossal step backward, in the direction of cold war, were made long before the events in Afghanistan.

[Question] To which decisions are you referring?

[Answer] The NATO decision, adopted in Washington in May 1978, about the annual increase in military budgets for the next 15 years, the U.S. President's decision of November 1979 on the "five-year plan" for the unprecedented buildup of U.S. military potential and the extremely dangerous NATO decision adopted in Brussels in December 1979 regarding the production and deployment of new American medium-range missiles in Europe. Besides this, the Americans had virtually stopped the arms limitation talks even before the events in Afghanistan. The ratification of the SALT II Treaty was already in question in September and October 1979.

In addition, there was the extremely hasty rapprochement with China on an obviously anti-Soviet basis. On top of all this, the United States sent many warships, planes and nuclear weapons to the Persian Gulf at the end of 1979. We could not believe that all of this was being done just to free the hostages in Tehran and that it was not part of the radical change in U.S. foreign and military policy.

This is why people in Moscow already believed in the middle of December 1979 that the United States had begun to modify its policy dramatically.

[Question] In other words, American policy influenced the Soviet Union's behavior in Afghanistan?

[Answer] It was one of the important factors....

[Question] If the normal development of detente had continued and the problems you mentioned had not come up, would the Soviet Union not have sent troops to Afghanistan?

[Answer] This possibility cannot be excluded. Please understand what I am saying: The assistance of Afghanistan was not "punishment" for the poor conduct of the United States or the West. But it was connected with our assessment of the new situation created by the United States and NATO.

As General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee L. I. Brezhnev remarked in January 1980 in a PRAVDA interview, the decision to send a limited military contingent to Afghanistan was not an easy decision to make. Long before the end of 1979 the Afghan Government made several requests for this kind of assistance. At the end of 1979 the situation in Afghanistan had to be assessed within the context of the escalation of international tension throughout the world, and particularly in this region. The threat to the revolutionary order in Afghanistan and the threat to our own security were of much greater proportions in this atmosphere than they would have been in an atmosphere of detente.

[Question] The events in Afghanistan gave rise to this kind of intervention by the Americans and their allies primarily because they were not sure of the Soviet Union's intentions. President Carter announced unequivocally that he could not take any risk as far as the Soviet Union's intentions were concerned. It is possible that America resolved to radically change its foreign policy long before the events in Afghanistan in the belief that the Soviet threat was growing, and that it regarded these events merely as confirmation of its fears.

[Answer] Frankly, when I hear the "Soviet threat" discussed by responsible politicians and specialists, and not simply by the average citizen who has been deceived by propaganda, I get the feeling that these people are not talking about the Soviet Union and its influence and intentions as much as about the United States, about American policy and about America's role in the world.

It is simply more convenient for America to announce fantastic claims and demands in the sphere of foreign and military policy, implying that they have been "provoked" by the Soviet Union and that it is precisely to the Soviet Union's actions that the Americans have had to respond. We believe, however, that no one provoked America to take a tougher foreign policy stance. The United States has systematically been working on the modification of its goals for a long time, and this has led it to its current assessment of its relations with the Soviet Union and the entire world.

[Question] But you will not deny that the Soviet Union has considerably strengthened its military power in recent years.

[Answer] Yes, our strength has increased. We had every reason to worry about our defense. I think that even those who complain so loudly about the Soviet military threat know that our weapons serve defensive, and not aggressive, purposes.

[Question] But NATO maintains that the weapons of the Soviet Union exceed "valid defense requirements."

[Answer] So what? These are people who notice a tiny speck of dust in someone else's eye but overlook an entire log in their own. I often ask myself: How would the American generals and politicians define their own "valid defense requirements" if approximately a million Warsaw Pact soldiers and around 700 nuclear weapons were deployed north of Michigan and if Texas were not across the border from Mexico, but from a country which had a population of a billion, possessed nuclear weapons, raved about its special destiny and laid claim to a large part of the American South?

One sign of the hypocrisy of American officials regarding the strategic position of the Soviet Union is the politically fashionable talk about the so-called "crescent of crisis." This term, coined by Brzezinski, refers to Southwest Asia and the Middle East. This region was declared a "sphere of American vital interests." But have any of those who accepted this concept given any thought to the fact that almost the entire length of the "crescent" stretches along our border and the borders of our southern neighbors and that, consequently, this is a region of tremendous significance to the security of the Soviet Union, or, in other words, that it is truly a zone of Soviet vital interests?

[Question] When I spoke with Paul Nitze, he expressed the opinion that the Soviet Union does not want a nuclear war. He does believe, however, that the Soviet Union is preparing to fight and win this kind of war.

[Answer] Perhaps I should thank Nitze for saying that we do not want a nuclear war, even if he only admitted it in a private conversation. This is not exactly a customary statement for him. But all the rest is a variation on an old theme.

[Question] You probably know that it is not only the "hawks" who express this view. There are others who believe that the Soviet Union is not excluding the possibility of this kind of war as a means of attaining political objectives.

[Answer] When they allege that we are prepared to fight and win a nuclear war, they usually cite remarks that were not made by the political leadership of the country, authorized to make decisions in regard to war and peace, or by the present military leadership. They take quotations from articles, statements and books by some Soviet military authors who examine, from their strictly professional vantage point, the question of how we should fight if we are forced to go to war, and I do not see anything abnormal or alarming in this. It is precisely the military leaders who should consider the actions they should take if war should break out. This does not necessarily mean that they regard nuclear war as a useful foreign policy instrument.

At the beginning of the 1960's I was in London at the time of the international crisis. In a cafe there, I saw a sign which read: "In the event of a nuclear attack, remain calm, pay your bill and proceed to the nearest cemetery." I am

afraid that if a military leader in any country had issued these orders, no one would have rewarded him for his sense of humor. He would have had to resign, and without any hope of a pension.

Let the accusers of the Soviet Union listen to what people are saying about this matter in the United States. And these people are not isolated military authors, but high-level military leaders. Let me give you a few examples. General Curtis LeMay, U.S. strategic aviation commander, insisted that the Americans be constantly prepared to "fight any war to the point of victory, including general war" (when he spoke of general war, he was not referring simply to a war commanded by generals). Former U.S. Secretary of Defense Melvin Laird wrote that American "strategy must be aimed at fighting wars, winning victories and achieving reconstruction" and that the United States should prepare for "total nuclear war" and convince the enemy "that we will take the initiative into our own hands and deliver the first strike." Another example is a statement by the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in 1977: "American nuclear strategy presupposes the maintenance of sufficient military strength for the purpose of intimidating an opponent, but if intimidation should not have the desired effect, we must have the necessary striking force to control the escalation of any conflict and end a war on terms acceptable to the United States." I assure you that you will find nothing comparable to this in the verbal or written statements of Soviet military leaders or anyone else in the Soviet Union.

[Question] When these matters are discussed in the West, Soviet military doctrine as a whole, and not isolated quotations, is taken into account.

[Answer] Nevertheless, in the final analysis, conclusions about our foreign policy are drawn precisely from these quotations. Without going into detail, I would like to again emphasize the most significant aspect of this matter: Soviet military doctrine is of an indisputably defensive nature. This is quite clearly reflected in the Soviet stand on the question of nuclear weapons. Allow me to quote the most authoritative source. This is a statement made by Marshal L. I. Brezhnev, supreme commander in chief of the USSR Armed Forces: "We are against the use of nuclear weapons; only extraordinary circumstances, aggression against our country or its allies, would force us to resort to this extreme form of self-defense" ("Leninskim kursom" [Following the Leninist Course], vol VII, p 300).

I would like to cite another quotation about the possibility of the first use of nuclear weapons. When General Secretary L. I. Brezhnev spoke in Tula in the beginning of 1977, he said: "Our efforts are aimed precisely at keeping the matter from reaching the point of the first strike or the second strike, at preventing nuclear war in general" (KOMMUNIST, Moscow, 1977, No 2, p 28).

I could also cite other similar statements by L. I. Brezhnev, Soviet Defense Minister D. F. Ustinov and other Soviet leaders.

The quintessence of these statements is that we see the prevention of war as the function of our strategic armed forces. The Soviet Union believes that it is senseless to strive for military superiority. As Comrade L. I. Brezhnev stressed, the very concept of this kind of superiority "loses meaning in the presence of today's huge arsenals of nuclear weapons and the means of their delivery" ("Leninskim kursom," vol VII, p 312). Soviet military doctrine, which has been explained

on numerous occasions by the Soviet leadership, unequivocally testifies that we view nuclear war as the most terrible misfortune that could ever befall mankind; that our strategy is of a defensive nature; that we are against the concept of the "first strike"; that the function of our strategic forces consists in intimidating a possible aggressor and that they are intended for retaliatory strikes.

All of this has been said numerous times by the most authoritative individuals. This is the gist of our military doctrine, and it would be impossible to discern any other, "secret" doctrine behind this one, simply because no other doctrine exists. As for all the various official statements by the American side, we feel that they express the opposite view.

[Question] To which American statements are you referring?

[Answer] What about, for example, when Brzezinski was interviewed by English journalist Jonathan Power. Brzezinski said that nuclear war should not be regarded as a terrible catastrophe in the final analysis because "only" 10 percent of the world population would die. Incidentally, "only" 10 percent would amount to 400 million people.

In essence, this is a variation on the old Maoist themes: "The nuclear bomb is only a paper tiger," "In the event of a nuclear war, only half the Chinese will die, and the rest will then begin a new and happy life" and so forth. Apparently, the rapprochement with Beijing and the game of chance with the Chinese card have had some effect.

After making this reassuring observation, Brzezinski added that "if the need arose," he would not hesitate--he would push the button and launch the missiles. It would be interesting to see the size of the headlines in the NEW YORK TIMES and WASHINGTON POST if a high-level Soviet spokesman were to make similar statements.

And this is not just idle talk. After all, it is precisely in the United States that theoretical and technological projects are being carried out energetically to guarantee the possibility of fighting and winning a nuclear war.

[Question] Are you exaggerating?

[Answer] Not at all. Carter's Directive 59 is only the latest offspring of an entire school of strategic thought that preaches "limited" nuclear war as a "flexible" method of using nuclear weapons. All of this is far from simple speculation. The appropriate military equipment is being developed--for example, smaller warheads with heightened targeting accuracy, neutron weapons, special delivery systems that are to be situated near the Soviet border, etc. Some feel that all of these measures are merely intended to give greater weight to American political threats. Even in this event, however, the danger of war is sharply increased because nuclear weapons can evade control if a conflict should escalate, regardless of the original intention. The constant attempts to erase the distinctions between conventional and nuclear wars are extremely dangerous.

[Question] Why?

[Answer] Because they tend to eliminate such impediments to nuclear war as the widespread aversion to this kind of war, the realization of its catastrophic consequences and, consequently, the conviction that it cannot be regarded as an acceptable political instrument. If people begin to believe in the possibility of resorting to nuclear war, the probability and possibility of this kind of war will increase considerably.

[Question] You apparently believe that the possibility of nuclear war cannot be excluded, and that this danger is increasing. Does this not imply that attempts must be made to minimize its consequences?

[Answer] This conclusion might seem logical, but the realities of the nuclear age demand a totally different way of thinking. I have already said that the very belief in the possibility of a "minor, neat and tidy nuclear war" undermines the resistance to nuclear conflagration. But this is not all. If the price that must be paid for this kind of war starts to seem more or less acceptable, this will unavoidably heighten the adventurism of the persons seated closest to the nuclear buttons. Their policy would be much less carefully considered and less balanced because they would believe that a miscalculation would give rise only to a small war without any particularly frightening consequences. If a truly crucial situation should arise, it would be easier to decide to push the button.

[Question] Nevertheless, the losses and destruction of "limited war" would be much less significant.

[Answer] No, we could hardly expect this. In my opinion, it is difficult to even imagine a "neat and tidy minor nuclear war." You see, any attempt to limit possible losses, by means of anti-missile or civil defense, would cause the other side to retaliate. It would increase the number of its warheads, enhance their ability to penetrate as far as possible into the depths of enemy territory and compound their destructive power. It is hardly likely that any side would make any special effort to prevent enemy losses from becoming too great. Nuclear war would not in the least resemble the aristocratic duel according to all the rules. If mankind were civilized enough for this, it would be easy to prevent nuclear war and to achieve universal and total disarmament.

No, we have no right to think of nuclear war as some kind of chivalric duel. There is no such thing as limited war or limited nuclear strikes. If nuclear war should break out, it could never remain limited. Escalation is particularly inevitable just by virtue of the very fact that neither side will want to admit its defeat. Besides this, imagine if nuclear bombs were exploding all around you. Would you be able to coldbloodedly calculate the particular enemy strike that would justify proper retaliation so that the "rules of the game" would be in no way violated? Escalation will be simply impossible to prevent.

It seems to me that the best description of the concept of limited war was given by John Culver, former Democratic senator from the state of Iowa, who was once a member of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. He compared this concept to the "limited effect of a match thrown into a powder-keg."

[Question] How did the Soviet Union react to Directive 59, in which President Carter set forth the new nuclear strategic doctrine?

[Answer] First of all, it is worth noting that the actual wording of Directive 59 has been kept secret by the United States; therefore, we in the Soviet Union can judge this document only by what the White House deemed necessary to announce to leading American press organs, and by some official statements--for example, the speech presented by former Secretary of Defense H. Brown at the naval academy on 20 August 1980.

There is sufficient indication, however, that the U.S. Government officially approved the concept of limited nuclear war. The assumption that it was inclined toward this concept had existed long before this time. Washington has chosen to deliberately clarify neither the specific circumstances in which it would start such a war nor other decisive aspects of the matter. This uncertain situation was most probably created on purpose to heighten the psychological impact of the new doctrine and simultaneously retain the right of maximum freedom of action for the United States.

[Question] What aspects of this doctrine do you find dangerous?

[Answer] Despite the constant allegations of this strategy's authors that it is only an amplification of the intimidation theory adhered to by previous secretaries of defense, from Robert McNamara to James Schlesinger, this is actually a qualitative change. The new strategy is intended to lower the nuclear threshold and increase the number of situations in which the United States would be justified to use nuclear weapons. It provides a pretext for a new round in the arms race, for an unbridled arms race. In addition to all this, the doctrine reinforces the tendencies leading to total destabilization in the sphere of military equipment and in the sphere of military strategic thinking. To justify this new strategy, the Americans speak of their fear of becoming the victims of a first strike, but they are actually striving to ensure the first-strike potential of U.S. strategic armed forces.

[Question] In view of the fact, however, that the only safeguard against nuclear war is the so-called "balance of fear," or the realization by both sides of the suicidal nature of nuclear war, is it possible that the new strategy is not so different from the old one?

[Answer] No, they are quite different. Directive 59 is not intended to alleviate the general fear of nuclear war, but to fuel the enemy's fear and simultaneously increase America's own power. Nuclear weapons will lie untouched in arsenals only as long as both sides feel equally threatened and are equally able to destroy one another. The greatest caution must be observed. There can be no silly games with the "balance of fear" that has prevented so many conflicts from escalating to the level of nuclear war.

On the other hand, it is quite obvious that a peace based on mutual intimidation is far from ideal and cannot last. The maintenance of intimidation potential calls for a sufficiently impressive arsenal, and this results in an arms race. Furthermore, it is also necessary to maintain the enemy's belief that he is threatened; in other words, the willingness to destroy the enemy, and to incinerate half the planet and commit national suicide at the same time, must be demonstrated. In addition to threats, saber-rattling and blackmail, this also requires periodic actions which attest to a capability for irresponsible behavior, adventuristic undertakings and impulsive conduct. The dangers inherent in this need no explanation.

[Question] Rosalyn Carter told Gail Sheehy of the NEW YORK TIMES: "Oh, I could imagine how a war could start. Jimmy would not be afraid to start a war to defend the honor of my country." But different people interpret honor in different ways.

[Answer] You are right, but it is even more important that nuclear war cannot be compared to a chivalric duel, unless we are speaking of an honorable suicide, of course.

Let us disregard the moral aspects, however. We are dealing here with an example of the unnatural logic engendered by the balance of fear. This logic requires constant recognition of the ability to commit mass murder on an extreme scale, or what might be termed megamurder. There is an insoluble dilemma here. On the one hand, we must agree that war is senseless. On the other hand, we must constantly prepare for war and stress our willingness to start a war. Regardless of our original intentions, this logic eventually leads us to the verge of catastrophe.

[Question] Is there any solution?

[Answer] In general, mutual intimidation can still be regarded as a lesser evil than preparations for "acceptable nuclear war." But it is impossible to live forever in an atmosphere of intimidation; sooner or later, it loses its effect. For this reason, we must find an alternative to intimidation. The question now concerns the direction we should take in our search for this alternative. It would be a catastrophe if we moved in the direction of "acceptable nuclear war." There is only one reasonable path, and this is the path to peace based on arms control and subsequent disarmament, the path of stronger trust and cooperation. There is no question that this is an extremely difficult path, requiring tremendous effort, great wisdom, patience and political courage. But there is most probably no other path to strong and lasting peace.

[Question] Kissinger once said: "Absolute security for only one of the superpowers is unattainable and, what is more, undesirable, because it would mean absolute insecurity for the other side." Is this not also one of the new realities of the nuclear age?

[Answer] Perhaps. I only doubt whether a member of the U.S. Government could rise so far above common sense as to call his own absolute security undesirable. And there is not even any need for this. The realization that absolute security is unattainable is enough. It is precisely this fact that must be acknowledged so that the arms race can stop. This reality of our time is closely related to another: So many means of destruction have been accumulated that their further accumulation would not strengthen national security. The exact opposite is true: The more weapons there are, the less security there will be. Farsighted Americans began to realize this more than 15 years ago. Jerome Wiesner and Herbert York wrote, for example: "The arms race has created a situation in which the reinforcement of military strength does not increase national security, but diminishes it. Judging by our professional experience, we are certain that there is no technical way of resolving this contradiction.... The arms race is like a spiral which rotates faster and faster and leads to oblivion."

[Question] When was this written?

[Answer] In 1964. And I would like to stress that when it comes to professional qualifications, experience and knowledge, it would be difficult to find two other Americans whose opinions would warrant more attention. Wiesner was President Kennedy's adviser on scientific affairs and York is an equally prominent scientist, who was connected directly with military production when he headed the Pentagon's research and development department.

I repeat, this was written in 1964. If people had listened to these words then, imagine how many billions could have been saved and how much the cause of peace could have benefited.

[Question] After many hours of discussion and many weeks of work on this book, I want to repeat the question with which I began: Will the 1980's be the decade of the second cold war?

[Answer] I would not retract a single word of my original answer. But I would like to add something.

[Question] This is precisely why I repeated the question.

[Answer] I want to add to my previous answer that the second cold war would also differ from the first in the sense that it would be, in some respects, a false cold war, or what the French might call a "strange cold war." It would be false because, in contrast to the first cold war, it could hardly rest on convictions. The convictions which lay at the basis of the first cold war were false, stemming from unjustified fears, biases and ignorance, but they did exist and did represent an important psychological factor.

We would have to have a very low opinion of the mental capabilities of people to believe that the Europeans of the 1980's could once again fall for the myths that were used to frighten them at the end of the 1940's. I think that even the Americans now know too much to return to the state in which they existed in the late 1940's and early 1950's. It is difficult to believe that they would again follow prophets like Senator Joseph McCarthy or Congressman Parnell Thomas--these apostles of the first cold war who, as it later turned out, were nothing more than swindlers (and swindlers, one could say, who rose to the status of apostles with the aid of the cold war). In fact, the second cold war would be artificial and only a few would find any meaning and purpose in it. And here is something even more significant: Now that people have learned what detente is like from their own experience, there are few who would see this kind of cold war as the only alternative to "hot" war. This would also be an artificial cold war in the sense that the United States would try to fuel it without having what it takes to win it.

It was unable to win the first cold war, when its position in the world was much stronger than it is today. It would be absolutely impossible for the United States to win this kind of war in the last quarter of our century. It is nevertheless a fact that it is precisely the United States that is trying to start this war, and this attests to a serious threat to peace and stability throughout the world.

[Question] Is it possible that East-West relations could improve if our entire civilization is threatened by mortal dangers?

[Answer] What can I say, one of these dangers is the danger of war, and we have already talked about this enough.

Another danger is the exacerbation of global problems, such as the supply of energy and raw materials, the food crisis and the problems of environmental protection and poverty in the Third World. The accuracy of the appraisals of the Club of Rome and other specialists could be disputed, but I feel that they reflect some real problems. The population of the world is expected to increase from the present 4.5 billion to 6 billion by the year 2000. This means that we will have to solve problems in the next two decades that once took centuries to solve. Our need for raw materials, especially sources of energy, is increasing to unprecedented proportions. The problem of providing mankind with food is an extremely urgent one. If present tendencies continue, the number of unemployed will rise to 1 billion by the end of the century.

[Question] Do you expect the vital need for solutions to these problems to stimulate detente and cooperation?

[Answer] Yes, I do. If I might borrow Carter's famous metaphor (although he used it in another context), these dangers can be regarded as the "moral equivalent of war" in the sense that they will require maximum effort and will necessitate cooperation by all states, particularly cooperation by the Soviet Union and United States.

[Question] I would like to ask you a personal question. In our discussions, we have touched upon a broad spectrum of problems. What is your personal view, your view as a man, as Citizen Arbatov?

[Answer] I think it would be worth repeating what I already wrote once in an article for NEWSWEEK, the American magazine. I am convinced that this view is shared by the majority of my generation in the Soviet Union.

My father went to war when he was 18. I also went to war when I was only 18. We were both lucky: We came back home. And I am very happy that my son, who is 30 now, did not have to fight. No one will return from the war that now threatens mankind. There will be no victors.

[Question] Do you sympathize with today's young people who are pessimistic about the future and have lost all hope of a more sane world with no danger of war?

[Answer] Antonio Gramsci believed that the best combination of pessimism and optimism in the human being was a pessimistic mind and an optimistic will. I think he was saying that people should see and recognize all dangers and negative tendencies but should also resolve to overcome them and build a better world. Unfortunately, we often encounter the opposite, in which case people are afraid to make truly realistic and discerning assessments of reality and feel helpless in times of crisis.

I personally would be afraid to entrust the fate of the world to a generation which had lost all hope. It is true that some of today's difficulties are unique in terms of the scales of the threat they pose to mankind. But after all that the people of my generation had to go through, I am certain that mankind has what it takes to overcome existing difficulties. The deciding factor is the will to combat these difficulties.

I do not think that all of today's young people are pessimistically inclined. To some degree, I can understand those who are filled with pessimism. They have encountered serious problems and are deeply disillusioned. This is more their misfortune than their fault. I think that the older generation bears a greater responsibility. We must preserve, for the younger generation, not only the hope of a better life on the planet, but also the planet itself.

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INTERNATIONAL

GEORGIAN COMMENTATOR PRAISES SADAT'S DESTRUCTION BY 'PATRIOTS'

[Editorial Report] Tbilisi KOMUNISTI in Georgian on 22 October page 2 carries a 1600-word commentary by Dr of History Sh. Kurdgelashvili on the destruction of President Sadat by Egyptian army patriots. It reflected the will of the people, who were finally fed up with Sadat's autocratic rule, his betrayal of Nasser's legacy, his turning away from the Soviet Union and toward the imperialist camp, the disgrace of the Camp David "deal," and so on. Throughout, the commentator implies that Sadat's "anti-communist" and "anti-Soviet" acts fed the Egyptian people's justified rage.

The author then dwells on the significance of the Egyptian Patriotic Front, founded in March 1980 in Beirut by representatives of Moslem, Christian, and communist groups. Unanimously elected as general secretary was Lt Gen Saad ad-Din ash-Shazli, a faithful follower of Nasser who received his military training in Egypt and in the Moscow Military Academy. In his own statement in praise of Sadat's assassination, ash-Shazli warns that if Sadat-type rule should resume, Egypt's patriots will not hesitate to use "revolutionary violence" to restore the people's rights. The commentator hints that the national army, which threw out Farouk in 1952, could again head up the struggle against imperialism. He then quotes the Soviet government's condemnation of joint U.S.-Egyptian military maneuvers in Egypt, which "cannot but affect the Soviet Union's security interests."

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NATIONAL

PARAMETERS FOR SOVIET SOCIOCULTURAL DEVELOPMENT DEFINED

Moscow OBSHCHESTVENNYE NAUKI in Russian No 6, 1981 pp 96-109

[Article by Yuriy V. Arutyunyan, doctor of historical sciences, professor, head of the sector of specific sociological studies of the Ethnographic Institute imeni N. N. Miklukho-Maklay, USSR Academy of Sciences. Author of monographs on "Mechanizers in USSR Agriculture," "The Soviet Peasantry During the Great Patriotic War," "Experience in Village Sociological Studies," "Social Structure of the Rural Population in the USSR," "The Social and the National" (as co-author), "Experience in Ethnosociological Studies of the Way of Life," and others. The present article is based on a chapter in the collective monograph "Aktual'nyye Problemy Natsional'nykh Otnosheniy v Svete Konstitutsii SSSR" [Topical Problems of National Relations in the Light of the USSR Constitution] (Nauka, Moscow, 1981), published in the "National Relations in the Contemporary Age" series: "Ethnosociological Study of Culture in the USSR"]

[Text] Social (in the broad meaning of the term) and purely ethnic processes can and must be subjected to effective studies on an interrelated basis. It is no accident that at the 26th CPSU Congress problems of development of national relations in the USSR were considered in a state of organic unity with those related to improvements in the socioclass structure of Soviet society.

The ethnosociological direction in the study of nations, which has been actively developed in the USSR during the past decade, was started at the crossing point of sociology and ethnography. On the one hand, the study of general social phenomena and processes in contemporary society calls for a determination of the national-specific features of their manifestation. On the other, ethnic characteristics (in particular language, national self-awareness, and elements of traditional national culture) are in themselves socially multivariant, i.e., they accumulate in varying amounts among sociodemographic population groups.

The need to take the national feature of social phenomena into consideration has been broadly confirmed. It would be no exaggeration to say that the entire system of social indicators applied in the USSR requires that national diversity be taken into consideration. Summarized indicators are usually applied in the discussion of basic social processes characteristic of the socialist society (elimination of disparities between town and country, surmounting major disparities between mental and physical labor, etc). This is natural in the case of the development of the socialist society as a whole (particularly when compared with the society of the opposite social system) or in assessing the broad historical changes which are taking place within it.

However, the regional-national variety of manifestation of social processes common to the entire country must be taken into consideration if we are to understand in detail the social phenomena typical of a multinational socialist state.

We shall illustrate the range of this variety of extreme indicators, ranging from the large-scale "community" (urban or rural) to the social microcell (the family). Whereas according to the all-union 1970 population census, 56 percent of the USSR population lived in cities, the share of urban residents in the main native national groups of union republics ranged from 65-68 percent among Russians and Armenians to 15-20 percent among Kirghiz and Moldavians.¹ Such fluctuations will retain their real social meaning as long as substantial disparities remain between rural and urban living conditions.

Equally noticeable are differences in another range of indicators--family size. According to the 1970 census, the average family in the USSR had 3.9 members. Among the different nationalities the family size ranged from 3.1 among Estonians to 5.8-6 among Uzbeks and Turkmens. It is self-evident that these differences affect many aspects of human life, especially important social behavior indicators such as migration and social mobility. Although behavior is determined by economic factors, the influence of the latter is not isolated from other determinants. It is no accident that with an essentially identical size of disparities between urban and rural living conditions, the attractiveness of the city is felt in Central Asian republics far less sharply than in many other republics in the USSR. Here, on an average, no more than 1-2 percent of the rural population migrate to the city, compared with up to 8 percent in the RSFSR. This conflicts with real manpower needs: in areas where the rural population is sufficient, the outflow hardly exhausts the natural growth, whereas wherever there is an obvious need for manpower resources such outflow leads to an absolute loss of manpower. The processes related to social mobility are affected by other, strictly ethnic, features as well. In particular, insufficient knowledge of the language of international communication, widespread in many cities in this area because of their ethnic structure, may be having a restraining influence on migration from rural areas in Central Asia. All of this proves quite eloquently the need to study general socioeconomic phenomena and mandatorily take into consideration their regional and ethnic specifics.

The topical nature of the other aspect of ethnosociology--the social base and multivariance of ethnic phenomena and processes--is even more obvious. The broadening of the cultural range, the internationalization of culture and way of life, the mastery and use of languages, the language of international communication above all, and so on, are largely based on social requirements and vary according to socioprofessional activity and environment. The ethnosociological study of these aspects--ethnosocial and socioethnic (i.e., "the ethnic in the social" and "the social in the ethnic")--has developed in a number of republics. In the first half of the 1960's, sociological studies of national problems were undertaken in Estonia, Latvia, Georgia and Kirghizia. Subsequently, such studies were undertaken in other union (Belorussian, Ukrainian, Armenian, Azerbaijani) and autonomous (Udmurtskaya, Bashkirskaya, Karel'skaya, Dagestanskaya, Kabardino-Balkarskaya, Severo-Osetinskaya, Checheno-Ingushskaya and other) republics in the USSR.

At the same time, an interrepublic study on "Optimizing Sociocultural Development Conditions and Rapprochement Among Nations in the USSR" (OSU) was undertaken by the sector of specific sociological studies of the USSR Academy of Sciences Institute of Ethnography together with republic scientific centers.

Today the ethnosociological study of processes of development and reciprocal enrichment of national cultures becomes particularly important.

The ethnosociological approach to the study of cultural problems is not isolated from other scientific directions. It tends to rely on specific data and to use the experience of various disciplines (sociology, ethnography, statistics, history, psychology). The ethnosociological approach is combined with the comprehensive study of the history of culture as suggested by Academician M. Kim.² However, if in a historical approach the researcher is interested mainly in the study of the stages of development of culture and their characteristics, in an ethnosociological study the main attention is focused on determining the mechanism itself of sociocultural contemporary processes. This mandatorily requires the study of ethnic parameters of social processes and phenomena. Specific ethnosociological studies of culture may provide data for the further development of the theory of national culture on which philosophers have been long and actively at work.

In our view, the socioethnic norm of human self-expression is the most important object of ethnosociological studies of national culture. The range of cultures and their "boundaries" are widening in the course of historical progress. Culture does not stop at the borders of a settlement, ethnic environment or state. The range of cultural perception by the individual is broadening steadily. At the same time, the means for the production and consumption of culture are becoming standardized.

Within this broad understanding of culture we can single out within it interrelated subsystems. To a certain extent, this is reflected in the following structure of its components: cultural fund, cultural dissemination mechanism, cultural consumption and mastery, which determine actual behavior.

The cultural fund may be material, ranging from primitive labor tools to a cosmodrome; spiritual, from early folklore to contemporary art; moral, from ordinary law to constitutional norms. We must distinguish between a historical and an operative fund, either of which has its own scale of operation, ranging from the family and settlement to the nation, the social system and all mankind.

The mechanism for the dissemination (transmission) of culture ranges from mass communication media to informal communications. Depending on the scale of the system, the role, functions and share of one or another cultural dissemination medium change. The bigger the system the more important becomes the dissemination of culture through mass information media and, respectively, the lesser the role of informal communications becomes. In the course of time, the scale of the institutional diffusion of culture becomes greater and informal contacts are reduced.

The ethnosociologists are concentrating on the consumption and mastery of culture. The following subsystems for the functioning of culture have been singled out:

Sociopolitical (specifically ideology);

Production--attitude toward labor, vocational guidance and others;

Spiritual, with two basic aspects: rational-emotional (primarily science) and emotional-rational--artistic culture. Spiritual culture obtains its physical manifestations in architecture, household use objects, technical equipment and others;

Social, including societal and family culture.

All of these subsystems "find their outlet" in the overall interrelated subsystem of moral culture.

The fact that culture in all such subsystems may be manifested in its active or passive form must be taken into consideration in making a study. The active aspect is manifested in actual behavior. Creativity is the culminating point of the active manifestation in culture, for it is precisely creativity that expands the cultural stock.

As a socioethnic normed self-expression of man, we have considered culture within the OSU program on various scales and levels--from the microgroup, the family above all, to the nation. Specific empirical data enable us to provide a relatively complete characterization of ethnic groups in the studied republics with a view to determining the common and specific features and development patterns and prospects. Such studies can help us to explain the inner mechanism of the process of rapprochement among nations and their scientific guidance.

A comparative study of the cultural interaction among nations makes it possible to formulate and resolve a number of basic and specific problems, as follows:

1. Determine the way the specific features of their cultural past, level of development of their own national culture, and nature of the historical experience in the areas of cultural, social and political relations among nations influence the development and rapprochement among them.
2. Determine the correlation between the development of national culture and the level of urbanization and industrialization of national republics.
3. Determine the patterns of change in the inner structure of national cultures (the infrastructure)--the correlation among material culture, language, artistic culture, value orientations, etc; determine the characteristics and pace of internationalization in various cultural areas (different in terms of type and level of development).
4. Determine the general and specific features of the cultural aspect of different nations, which makes possible a more profound cultural-ethnic characterization of contemporary nations.

Furthermore, a number of "traditional" problems must be resolved on the basis of broader and essentially new comparative data: the social structure of nations must be characterized; the role of national affiliation and other national factors (language, behavior) in the social mobility process must be determined; the variety of cultural characteristics of social groups of nations and their social mobility must be determined; the ratio between international and traditional-national features in social groups must be brought to light; the extent and depth of their mastery of contemporary national culture must be defined; the laws which affect processes of cultural exchange among nations must be found; and the link between the development of national culture and national relations governed by a system of national concepts, must be established.

The theoretical definition of the criteria of optimum development of sociocultural processes assumes an essential significance. Three criteria may be singled out: the first is related to strictly cultural development. We know that in the course of the "Westernizing" and urbanization of culture, national culture may wither away. In such a case, one cultural orientation is entirely replaced by another. From our viewpoint, this cannot be considered an optimum variant of sociocultural development. The latter is characterized by the absolute broadening of the cultural range of the individual and a mastering of world culture without losing the progressive element of one's own culture.

The other optimality criteria are found in correlated cultural areas, above all on the level of the interrelationship between culture and economics. We know that the development of culture, on the one hand, and of the production process, on the other, does not take place evenly. The role which the individual plays as a member of the production collective is narrower than the one he plays as a citizen.³

However, relations between production and culture may be optimized not only as a result of the comprehensive development of production in accordance with the requirements of the individual but also by optimizing the processes of sociocultural development, mainly through a certain reorientation in cultural development. Culture can be not only a means for production growth but a self-seeking aim, i.e., it can be not only strictly utilitarian but a direct source of spiritual enjoyment and creativity in a harmoniously developed individual. This increases the compensatory functions of culture and culture and economics interact as a self-regulating system within which the contradictions created by development disproportions are naturally abated. The next criterion in optimizing sociocultural processes is found on the sociopsychological level. Language, awareness of common origin and historical destinies, customs, and so on are the consolidating factors of this criterion in a nation. However, an egocentric tendency may develop on this basis. This auxiliary product of sociocultural development may become a factor which hinders the progress of national culture and, in the final account, leads to a feeling of exclusivity. The optimum development of sociocultural processes, therefore, presumes the elimination of the threat of deformation of the national feelings by increasing cultural contacts and reciprocal enrichment among nations. The internationalization of national culture is a characteristic of its healthy development. It is precisely nations which can absorb the achievements of world culture and transform it in accordance with their own historically developed cultural forms that have the most powerful cultural potential.

The process of rapprochement among nations becomes exceptionally topical today. We invest the term "rapprochement among nations" with a double meaning. On the one hand, it implies the "equalization" of their social and cultural standards and the creation of basically similar socioprofessional structures and actual identical access to and measure of consumption by all nations of the spiritual wealth of mankind and, on this basis, the development of common features. On the other hand, this implies interrelationship among nations as such. As we know, similarity does not always mean solidarity. Sometimes it intensifies rivalry, for it equalizes the competitive opportunities of nations. That is why the internationalization of cultures must be mandatorily accompanied by the assertion of internationalist principles in relations among nations.

The general hypothesis of the OSU is based on the idea that cultural development of nations is determined by social factors. Consequently, national relations are considered on the level of class and socioprofessional population groups. The studies focused on determining the interrelationship between changes in the social structure of nations and the process of further rapprochement between the levels of their economic and cultural development and among the specific historical destinies of nations. The theme of the study is not individual specific phenomena but their system, their totality of interrelated processes. Essentially, this is a set of different studies, some of which are specifically sociological, conducted on the basis of the same system and subordinated to the overall objectives of optimal social planning.

The purpose of such planning in this area is the creation of a maximally favorable regimen for the sociocultural growth of the individual (essentially, the level of his sociocultural growth represents the level of the progressiveness of a society). The final objective of the OSU is to determine this growth and define its parameters and factors. The solution of this problem depends on three subordinate operations: defining the level of the social growth of the individual, his cultural growth (standard) and improvement of international orientations. Development of each of these qualities is not always harmonious and their optimum combination is a most important management problem. In the final account, the study is based on a system of operations aimed at determining the conditions which govern the development of human capabilities and the realization of developed capabilities.

Both abilities and their realization are determined by the interaction between the individual and the microenvironment (specific living conditions) and macroenvironment (social situation at large). Speaking of the development of capabilities, we must particularly emphasize operations which reflect channels or factors of primary, of early socialization of the personality. The decisive ones among them are the family, the school and the settlement in which the individual develops (village, small, average or big city, and so on). As to the realization of capabilities, the essential features here are the contemporary levels of socialization. The determination of the "conditions for the materialization of capabilities" is broken down into operations which bring to light the level of labor, sociopolitical and sociocultural activities and activities in daily life.⁵

The functioning of these channels largely depends on the sociocultural stock, whose classification into two areas is essential (material-production and spiritual, which is particularly important in terms of our objective). The study of the individual elements of the cultural stock of a nation, therefore, is mandatory in rounding out the research system. As to international upbringing, it follows the same channel as cultural development. Its study calls for a consideration of the ethnic aspect (for example, the language in which training is provided at school, the ethnic situation in production collectives, the ratio between the international and the national in the value stock of national culture, ideology, etc). The effect of these factors varies from one republic, city and rayon to another, depending on the specific and the general social situation.

In order to understand the OSU system it is necessary to discuss several concepts used in the analysis and the means for their "instrumental expression."

The social growth of the individual represents the changed positions of the individual in the social structure. These positions are two-dimensional. They are

defined by the quality of labor and the area of its application. We can single out areas such as city-village, state and kolkhoz-cooperative sector, and block sectors such as industry, transportation, construction, communications, services and agriculture, as well as nonproduction areas such as household work and school attendance.

Based on work quality, the intelligentsia groups may be classified as follows: administrative, including party-governmental and departmental-economic; scientific and technical and scientific-humanitarian; artistic-creative; finally, mass, including physicians and teachers. Among workers and peasants, the groups are classified on the basis of skill. We shall not provide here a theoretical substantiation of this classification, for such information may be found in several publications.⁵ Let us merely point out that the classification takes into consideration not only differences in the social organization of labor and the ways and means of acquisition of the social product but the related social interests, which is particularly essential in the study of national interests.

Social growth is described through the concept of social mobility--vertical, horizontal, intergeneration and intrageneration. We shall not analyze these concepts, for their definition has been universally accepted. Let us single out in particular the concept of "social mobility," which describes the physical act of a change of status.⁶ Mobility is a broader and sociologically deeper concept, for it presumes a study not only of changes but of the sociopsychological aspects of mobility. The mobility process is analyzed at various points. The positions of the parents, of the subjects of the study and of adult children at the start of their labor careers and at the time of the investigation (city or village, area of activity, etc) are compared. Furthermore, the planned preferred mobility is determined (conventionally speaking, social plans and social dreams). This is important in forecasting the social growth of a person and in establishing the psychological climate to which national orientations are related.

The person's career, data on the parents' employment and educational level, the children's occupation, preferred type of employment and so on are reflected in the questionnaire. Data corrections are accomplished with the help of special procedures which take into consideration manpower demand and supply, the individual's situation when enrolling in a higher educational institution, his situation when filling vacancies, etc. These procedures are based on statistical data, personal files, labor records, expert surveys, etc. The overall system is such that the elimination of one or another procedure (as in the absence of specialists, for example) does not determine its fate or prevent the study of the basic topics. Although many procedures are optional, their implementation could make the study particularly effective.

Cultural growth is determined not only by the educational level of the individual but the extent to which he has mastered the cultural stock and cultural orientations and requirements. Several scales (so-called "thermometers") are used in determining the individual's exposure to culture and requirements. The most important among them are "national-international cultural orientation," "national-professional," and "traditional (archaic)--contemporary."

In the national scale the variables are language, national and international types of artistic creativity (music, dance, poetry) and some national elements of so-called traditional culture, including types of material culture such as food and interiors. In each separate case we single out in pairs value (orientation) and actual behavior

or remainder of one or another cultural element. An orientation on the national alone is interpreted as narrow-national, while an orientation which involves no national forms is considered "international." In our understanding, coinciding international and national orientations are a syndrome of the international and the national in culture. The proper organization of the scales will enable us to formulate the syndrome of generalizing indicators, which will help us to quantify the collected data.

Since one of the important purposes of the OSU is to show value orientations, it pays great attention to spiritual culture. We proceed from the assumption that ethnic choices (i.e., the possibility of giving preference to national elements) in material culture in modern urbanized society, particularly under Soviet conditions, where a unified economy and an all-union division of labor prevail, are extremely limited. As a rule, the choice is based not on orientation but on the level of consumption and accessibility. The material culture of the individual is determined not by his orientation but by both his present and past situation. This is directly related to the level of his material well-being. The possibilities of following ethnic orientations in various areas of material culture vary. For example, the most frequently mentioned item is housing, followed by furnishings and food, etc. Therefore, in order to determine the ethnic orientations (choices) in material culture, the researcher must develop an ideal situation. The expressed preferences are compared with the actual behavior or, more accurately, the inherited physical environment. Choices in material culture are considered an element of the national and international syndrome.

The other procedure in the continua of cultural development is indirectly related to internationalization processes. The purpose of the most important among them is to determine the orientation as it shifts from traditional to contemporary culture. Furthermore, based on the nature of the research, we may introduce a system which establishes the strictly utilitarian and the broader orientations (culture as a means of social mobility and culture as a self-seeking aim, a source of spiritual pleasure), etc. In this case the variables are the different types of cultures and values, including moral ones. For example, the attitude toward the woman in the family and in social life is an indicator of traditional or contemporary orientation. The entire system of value orientations at different levels is determined--sociomoral (understanding of "individual happiness"), local (system of urban and rural orientation), and family.

However, the purpose of the study is not to re-create the entire system of orientations consistent with the various human role functions. The task is to find for each level and area the dominating value and to re-create in a way a system of dominating values representing the various areas of human activity. Indirectly, the purpose of this search is to understand ethnic processes, for we assume that disparities and differences among nations are manifested in the value orientation system as well.

In addition to cultural tendencies, the national-psychological tendencies which develop through contacts with people of other nationalities are clarified, for otherwise we are dealing with tendencies in the area of national relations. One of the most important tasks of the study is to define the level of coordination between sociocultural and sociopsychological orientations.

As to the channels and factors of sociocultural growth, these are concepts which need no particular clarification. The OSU has channels of direct contact influence such as family, neighbors and production collective, studied in accordance with a "time factor" (such as parental family and one's own family). Particular attention is paid to communicating facilities between town and country within and outside the republic. Furthermore, factors of indirect influence are studied, mainly mass information media. The purpose of our questionnaire is to determine the influence of the various information channels on shaping the individual and their intensiveness and frequency with which they influence the individual. Clearly, social procedures may be applied in the study of individual influence channels.

In order to complete the work on the OSU, a number of individual problems in the systems analysis of obtained data must be solved with a computer. Some additional studies will be required based not on mass population surveys but on a set of objective documentary information obtained from archives and current files. However, the existing data as well will make it possible to determine some dominating trends in the development of the nations in the USSR.⁷

The materials from the study prove that the old religious and other ideological barriers which separated one nation from another have been outlived in the USSR on the basis of economic and ideological cultural unity. Intensive contacts among nations and a single socialist ideology and outlook create the foundations for the development of integration processes in the spiritual culture of the peoples. They develop a single value fund and joint moral concepts. This indicates the moral unity of the new historical community--the Soviet people.

It has been established that in the course of the interpenetration among national cultures it is precisely professional rather than folklore-popular funds which play an active role. Nations with a developed professional culture have a better opportunity to influence other peoples. On the other hand, with a less developed professional cultural base, the nations frequently accept nonnational information more actively. Consequently, the historical logic of the development of culture leads to the fact that previously culturally backward nations develop at a particularly fast pace.

As the data indicate, internationalization processes develop in a descending order from material to spiritual culture. Under socialism, material culture is an area of maximal cultural comity, related to the development of the economy, total elimination of "market boundaries" of the past and the establishment of a single economic system. Nevertheless, in some areas of material culture some national characteristics remain under the influence of the historical past socioethnic environment and religious characteristics. As our study indicates, this applies mostly to food. Thus, national dishes are preferred by a very insignificant percentage of native nationalities inhabiting RSFSR and Estonian cities--2-6 percent; other respective figures are 39 percent for Moldavia, 65 percent for Georgia and 87 percent for Uzbekistan. However, this food orientation is more regional than national. It is no accident that members of other nonnative nationalities who live in a given republic are far more oriented toward national food traditional in such republics rather than their own cuisine. The choice here is dictated by natural conditions and, to a certain extent, customs which are rational in a given environment rather than merely by national orientation and national specifics.

Internationalization processes in the area of spiritual culture are far more complex and varied. In this area, the internationalization of the content of culture is perfectly clear. This is reflected, among others, in the uniform social concepts of the nation. Naturally, this does not eliminate the preservation of national specifics in the forms and specific manifestation of the various cultural aspects. Whereas in material culture residual phenomena are not exclusively ethnic but are related to regional characteristics, in spiritual culture we note a preservation of national forms.

As to the culture of daily life, family culture in particular, this is an area of relatively deep national specific background. Intimate interpersonal relations--an area of human life which is the least subject to social influence--concentrate here. It is no accident that the study indicates the stability of intrafamily national values and great differences among nationalities in family behavior. Statistical data as well show differences in the degree of stability of family relation traditions. The share of women doing skilled work in agriculture (intellectual and physical) varies among the individual republics in the USSR and is stably correlated with the size of the family, whose size is inversely proportional to women's employment. Naturally, all of this frequently predetermines the real behavior reflected, among others, not only on family parameters (stability of marriages, share of divorces, and others), but many other nonfamily indicators such as, for example, orientation toward social mobility and migration. Nevertheless, available data show that this area as well is being subjected to active changes consistent with overall development trends. Independence in private and public life is being increasingly valued and obsolete behavioral forms dictated by the old patriarchal system are being rejected. This is manifested in family life, the set of moral values and the system of sociomoral guidelines.

OSU data prove that as a system national culture is gradually changing--some forms are eliminated while others develop and adapt to new production and consumption conditions. As a whole, some national forms of culture not only endure but actively develop in their most progressive areas which, as a rule, have an international expression and, consequently, a "common language" with other nations.

Cultural changes influence the psychology of national relations. However, as our study indicates, we should not expect any automatic change of psychological national concepts under the influence of culture alone. Unquestionably, the expanded range of orientations in culture, familiarity with the culture, behavioral norms, language, and so on of other nations contribute to the elimination of national prejudices among that segment of the population which, by virtue of a low educational level and low mobility in the way of life may show conservatism in contacts with people of other nationalities whose way of life is different from their own traditional concepts. As to the educated segment of the population doing skilled labor, its national-psychological orientations may be influenced mainly by a specific directed cultural influence and by a system of measures which directly affect socioprofessional interests.

Within the overall trend of internationalization of culture, a variety of specific ways followed by this process are apparent in ethnic and social environments. These differences are related to specific historical premises, specific situations (such as intensive local international contacts) and differences in the degree of the need to be exposed to one or another element of a different culture. Nations with

a developed culture can draw more from their own sources. Both trends of internationalization--exposure to a different culture and broadening of one's own culture--are integrative. They combine with each other and are mutually supplementary. The general process of development and transformation of culture and the broadening of its range in accordance with the requirements of the international consolidation of nations follow a variety of channels.

FOOTNOTES

1. See "Itogi Vsesoyuznoy Perepisi Naseleniya 1970 g." [Results of the 1970 All-Union Population Census]. Vol IV. Moscow, 1973.
2. See M. P. Kim. "O Kul'ture kak Predmete Istoricheskogo Izucheniya" [On Culture as a Topic of Historical Study]. Moscow, 1974.
3. For example, secondary education is sufficient for working on a conveyor production line in modern production. Active participation in the management of such production and in the social control of it requires extensive professional knowledge and a high educational level.
4. In turn, each of these operations is concretized. For example, the "study of conditions of labor activities" must include items such as the division of labor, type of activity, labor wages and organization, system of management and relations within the collective and so on. The summarizing indicator of the various working conditions is the satisfaction with it. A similar "decoding" is possible for each separate operation.
5. See Yu. V. Arutyunyan, "Opyt Sotsiologicheskogo Izucheniye Sela" [Experience in the Sociological Study of the Countryside]. Moscow, 1968; idem "Sotsial'naya Struktura Sel'skogo Naseleniya SSSR" [Social Structure of the Rural Population in the USSR]. Moscow, 1971, etc.
6. See M. N. Rutkevich and F. R. Filippov, "Sotsial'nyye Peremeshcheniya" [Social Migrations], Moscow, 1970.
7. For a review of published works see Yu. V. Arutyunyan and L. M. Drobizheva, "Ethnosociological Studies in the USSR," SOTSIOLOGICHESKIYE ISSLEDOVANIYA, No 1, 1981.

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REGIONAL

ROUNDTABLE ON DIFFERING FORMS OF PRIVATE-PUBLIC COOPERATION IN AGRICULTURE

Tbilisi ZARYA VOSTOKA in Russian 17 Oct 81 p 2

[Report by G. Mchedlishvili: "Advantage of the Private Plot "]

[Text] General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, Chairman of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet Comrade L.I. Brezhnev has noted that the basis of forming state marketing food resources is without doubt public production. "At the same time," Comrade L.I. Brezhnev pointed out, "it is important to fully utilize the resources of private subsidiary farms." In recent years, practical measures have been and continue to be implemented relating to the improvement of conditions of operating private subsidiary farming; thanks to this, as pointed out at the 26th Congress of the Communist Party of Georgia, the first results have already been achieved--a stable tendency has been marked of increase of the number of cattle on private subsidiary farms and of reduction of the number of the rural population not having one. A reliable aid in this matter has shown to be such a form of economic relations as cooperation of collective with private farms.

Cooperation of collective farms with the population on the basis of contractual agreements has long been practiced in the republic. In recent years, this practice was improved. In the seventies, despite a significant curtailment of the share of private subsidiary farms in the total production and procurement of agricultural products, their absolute growth has been almost 1.6-fold and sales to the state almost twofold.

But the potential for increase of production of agricultural products, especially animal-husbandry products, on private farms exists in almost all of the rayons. The job of party, soviet and agricultural organs in the republic is to find the best and most acceptable forms for a given region of utilization of these possibilities. For this end, special interest is presented by the experience of a number of rayons in our republic, which were positively marked by Comrade L.I. Brezhnev at the time of his visit to Tbilisi. This accumulated experience is described today at the "round table" of ZARYA VOSTOKA by the chairman of Abashskiy

Rayon Agricultural Production Association, V. Khutsishvili, the chairman of the Makharadzevskiy Rayon Agricultural Production Association and the head of the Gruzptitseprom Production Association of the Poultry Raising Industry, V. Gvardzhaladze.

V. Khutsishvili: Inasmuch as at the 3rd Plenum of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Georgia, Abashskiy Rayon was among the first of a number of rayons to achieve successes in the field of cooperation of collective with private farms, I shall begin the talk.

Cooperation of collective farms with owners of private farms in the production and procurement of pork in our case began to develop stage by stage in 1979-1980. In 1979, we used two forms of cooperation and then in 1980 we turned to a third--this time the only one for the production of pork and for the production of milk.

What is the nature of each of them? In the case of the first form, a kolkhoz farmer, worker or pensioner residing on the territory of a collective farm or a physician, teacher or the like living in the village fattens his own piglet to 90-100 kilograms of weight and turns over to the farm pork at the state purchase price, obtaining in addition 3.5 kilograms of corn kernels also at the state price for each kilogram of meat.

In the second case, he obtains this piglet from the farm, paying it the value of the initial weight. In case of its dying, the owner of the private farm is obliged either to pay the farm its value or put on another piglet of the same weight to fatten. The collective farm in both of these forms pays the owners of private farms for the labor they spent on the care and fattening of the piglets.

In 1980 we used another form, which in the view of scientists was economically more profitable both for the collective farm and for the owners of private plots. It is used in the production of milk and in the production of pork and provides for the allotment to workers, employees and pensioners engaged in cooperation of 0.5 hectare of plowland, whose cultivation is totally assumed by the farm. It is the same as sowing one's own corn seeds, application of fertilizers and use of transport and livestock-expert services. A cooperating owner of a private subsidiary farm is credited with a certain number of labor-days; 70 percent of the crop produced on the allotted area of corn is issued in the form of additional pay, while chala, soybeans and ordinary beans and intermediate crops produced on the same area are issued in full and for free.

In case of necessity, the farm issues credit for the acquisition of productive cattle (cows, heifers), provides private animal-husbandry farms where possible with coarse and succulent fodder at cost.... The owner of the private subsidiary farm engaged in cooperation with the collective farm is under the obligation of providing it with 50 kilograms of cheese or the amount of milk required for its production and 100 kilograms of pork; furthermore 80 percent of the milk or cheese and the entire amount of pork are to be made available before harvesting work.

The popularity of cooperation is graphically demonstrated by figures. As of 1 January 1980, the rayon included 9,300 rural households; of these 2,785 families were

engaged in cooperation. Today about 3,500 families are involved in cooperation; they are fattening about 15,000 pigs and this year there will be sold 1,000 tons of meat above plan.

N. Takidze: Cooperation of collective and private farms began in our case in 1977 in a relatively simple form. During 1979-1980 it achieved a broader scope and assumed one might say a mass character. The rayon's kolkhozes and sovkhoses began to issue on the basis of contractual principles cattle and pigs for fattening and for the production of milk by productive cows. This year, 5,074 families are engaged in cooperation for the production of milk and already 1,174 tons of it have been produced in the rayon. A total of 5,552 families are engaged in the production of meat; 870 tons of beef and pork have been produced, of this, 614 tons have been turned over to the state. For example, their number this year compared to 1980 has grown by 800.

What forms of cooperation are practiced in the rayon? We have several--three in the production and procurement of milk and dairy products and two in the production and procurement of meat. ZARYA VOSTOKA described them in detail on 2 August 1980. But they have a common foundation--this is the conclusion of a strict contract on a voluntary basis.

In addition to this, the first steps are being taken in the rayon for cooperation with owners of private subsidiary farms in the production and sale to the state of poultry and rabbit meat.

V. Gvardzhuladze: This is undoubtedly the right road to take; in the development and implementation of the food program, cooperation with the population can greatly increase the production of poultry meat and create additional reserves of it.

The first steps taken by our poultry factories in this direction provide the basis for making the conclusion that the forms and principles of cooperation are creating an eager interest among the population, and they must be developed in every possible way. The results relating to the growth of poultry have turned out to be quite satisfactory; weight gains at most farms were within normal limits as stipulated by contracts, while a state of good preservation of them was found quite high at many of the farms.

Despite the short time that has elapsed since the conclusion of the first contracts, poultry farms have secured tens of tons of essentially first-rate poultry meat through cooperation with the population, and citizens themselves are getting a good income.

In the handling of this work, we ran into difficulties. First, in order to fully satisfy the growing requirements of the population for day-old chicks, we have to have adequate amounts of broiler incubative eggs, and there is a shortage of them. In order to eliminate this gap between resources and demand, we have to carry out a number of measures. For example, several poultry farms have already been transferred from eggs in the direction of meat. Moreover, there is planned a high priority construction of an area for a parental flock at the Caspian Broiler Poultry Factory for 160,000 bearing hens, which provides the possibility of increasing the number of day-old chicks turned over for rearing by private subsidiary farms to 4 million. This will make it possible to produce an additional more than 3,000 tons of poultry meat.

A serious problem is presented with respect to zooveterinarian servicing of private farms, provision of feed to place of rearing of poultry, availability of aid to subsidiary farms in the erection of most elementary structures and the like. The accomplishment of these operations is connected with the inevitability of constant mutual contacts, and this creates for both sides the danger of bringing in infection with all the serious consequences stemming therefrom. At the present time, measures are being developed together with the Veterinary Administration of the republic Ministry of Agriculture that would regulate all questions relating to the strict observance of veterinary prescriptions, but other questions also have to be solved. We consider it correct for citizens whose conditions are such as to provide for normal maintenance of poultry and who reside only an insignificant distance away from the poultry factory to become involved in private subsidiary farms in work relating to the rearing of poultry on cooperative principles. Here one should think out the question of the number of day-old chicks to be issued for rearing by a single subsidiary farm.

I return once more to the question of day-old chicks. Satisfying of the need of the population in the shortest possible time does not seem possible because there are only two broiler poultry factories in the system. We believe that this work should be transferred to incubator-poultry raising stations. Such a solution is favored by their quantity, location by regions of the republic, a large amount of experience in selling day-old chicks to the population and by other factors. But these incubator stations should be appropriately prepared both organizationally and materially. Broiler poultry factors should provide incubator stations with incubative eggs.

Thus the work of rearing poultry on private subsidiary farms on cooperative principles will include most of the republic's regions; its scale will increase significantly, and the number of citizens taking part in this important work that is profitable to both sides.

In his report "On the Draft of the Constitution (Fundamental Law) of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the Results of its Nationwide Discussion" at the Session of the USSR Supreme Soviet of 4 October 1977, Comrade L.I. Brezhnev said on the proposal to eliminate or sharply restrict subsidiary farms: "This is a form of labor not connected with exploitation which plays at this time a useful role in our economy." And it is very important for the cooperation of kolkhozes and sovkhoses in this form of labor to bring about perceptible results first and foremost in the growth of the volume of production and procurement of animal-husbandry products.

7697

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REGIONAL

MORE RAYON-LEVEL CONTROL OF FARM SERVICE ORGANIZATIONS URGED

Moscow SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA in Russian 20 Oct 81 p 2

[Article by P. Bondarenko, chief of the agricultural production administration of Sandovskiy Rayispolkom, Kalininskaya Oblast: "Who is the Coauthor of the Harvest"]

[Text] I am in complete accord with the authors of the articles published in SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA under the heading "The Rayon Economic Link" to the effect that the basic foundation of the agroindustrial complex is bound to be the rayon link. Only it can provide for the development of fair and at the same time rational economic ties between kolkhozes, sovkhoses and organizations and enterprises which in one way or another contribute to the production of agricultural products or purchase and process them. The experience of past years leads us to this conclusion.

It has already been written in SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA that in repairing equipment rayon associations of Sel'khoztekhnika do not think sufficiently of reducing the cost of repairs and often strive to get maximally large sums. We know that Sel'khoztekhnika is today in rural localities by virtue of its monopolistic possession of spare parts, including the ones in shortest supply. Certain unscrupulous representatives of it frequently take advantage of this. "Do you need a rear axle and engines? By all means, only we are unable to install them as we do not have any fitters at this time." The kolkhoz or sovkhos mechanic will agree to anything just to get a machine running: "We shall do the installation; do you think we have no specialists?"--"Then take it, but get the papers through the machine shops." This means that the farm will have to pay not only for the spare parts but also for the repair work--as if everything had been done by the fitters from Sel'khoztekhnika.

I shall cite only two concrete examples. In May of this year, Kolkhoz imeni Sverdlov to our Sel'khoztekhnika association for capital repair work on a MTZ-80 tractor; actually, the spare parts cost 1,007 rubles, and 186 rubles were obtained illegally. In June, in order to get missing spare parts for a combine, which was being repaired locally, the kolkhoz was obliged to overpay by a sum of 165 rubles. Of course, heads of farms can be accused of unscrupulousness by indulging in such violations. But what are they to do? They frequently have no other way out.

The situation has reached a point where farms have foisted on them equipment for which they have not the slightest need. Once, for example, they brought us vegetable drills, although we grow no vegetables. Then they began to send flax thrashers. But we harvest flax with combines....

We may be asked: why, actually, do you not expose such facts, why are not proceedings instituted against the guilty parties? We do expose, we do institute proceedings, but our measures are of little effect inasmuch as such deals are of economic interest to one or the other side. The head of a farm understands that downtime of a combine or a tractor will cost him dear, and we, of course, try not to spoil good relations with Selkhoztekhnika. Selkhoztekhnika personnel under the existing system of indicators are not concerned with the harvest but with the pursuit of gain; profit for them is the chief result and culmination of all their labors.

There is, I think, just one conclusion: it is necessary to redirect Selkhoztekhnika (and as quickly as possible) to the harvest, to real end results and to introduce a system of pay in which profit and income would be in direct and immediate relationship to the profit and income of agricultural enterprises that they service and on how efficiently the equipment operates there.

I would first include among the chief indicators average output of equipment repaired by Selkhoztekhnika--in standard hectares or engine hours: the higher it happens to be, the higher the size of bonuses and other payments to personnel of the association. The quality of repair work would undoubtedly rise: what is the sense of getting rid of a patched up combine if the money does not go into paying for repairs but rather for the time the machine is in the field. In addition it would be worthwhile to take into account average downtime for technical reasons of each machine that is serviced by Selkhoztekhnika: then its workers would finally find the interest in the quickest possible elimination of defects and the quickest possible return of the equipment to operation. At the present time they simply are not interested in how much tractors cost and how long they work: it is even better for them that they break down more often for then it would be easier for kolkhoz and sovkhos machine operators to agree to overpay.

Among the most important results of the work of Selkhoztekhnika there should be included the level of mechanization of production of agricultural products. At the present time, even those possibilities that exist at hand are not being used. Today, for example, industry puts out a complete selection of machines required for the transition to an industrial technology of cultivating flax. Selkhoztekhnika sells these machines, but whether they work or not does not bother it, although the permanent schedule of rayon associations includes a special service for the introduction of new equipment. And there are specialists aplenty, and the best engineering forces are concentrated there.

It goes without saying that my proposals, like other proposals of the same kind, require study. The development of a new system of indicators redirecting Selkhoztekhnika from the profit ruble to the quintal of production is not simple. I can well imagine the difficulties that Selkhoztekhnika would meet up with under the new conditions. It would lose a part of the profit for reasons over which it has no control, but the end results would show, for example, the skill level and degree of conscientiousness of kolkhoz and sovkhos machine operators. Well, so what? This is not a defect but a virtue of the indicators proposed by me. Selkhoztekhnika would then have to establish control over the use of equipment and over cadre training; its representatives would spend days and nights in the field.

Many difficulties are caused by the fact that neither Selkhoztekhnika nor Selkhozkhimiya is directly subordinate to the rayon agricultural administration. We could

achieve this only when we rest on the force and the authority of Soviet organs of power. Here I am in complete agreement with the main conclusion of the director of the Orenburg Sarinskiy Sovkhoz, I. Solovykh, in the article "Without Change of Sign" (SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA of 27 September): we must invest with fullness of power and load with work those organs that exist in the rayons. The assignment schedule for Selkhozkhimiya and routes of mechanized detachments are determined, for example, by decision of the ispolkom of the rayon soviet. And what do you do if an operating intercession in the question is required? We frequently hear in reply to our wishes and recommendations:

"We cannot, we have our own plans."

I repeat, I would like to join forces with those who already have proposed in the pages of SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA operative guidance of rayon associations of Selkhoztekhnika and Selkhozkhimiya and planning of their work to be put in the hands of rayon organs of power. It would be better for this if oblast associations restricted themselves to the allocation of capital investment, problems of technical policy and material supply. It can be seen better in the rayon what should be done where and first of all.

The administration of such organizations as Mezhkolkhozstroy, Mezhkolkhozdorstroy and Mezhkolkhozsovkhozes should be transferred to the rayons. While established with the funds of kolkhozes and sovkhoses, they have become under the influence of their oblast administrations independent firms in fact and have succeeded in becoming basically bogged down in narrow departmental interests. For example, Pamyat' Zhdanova Kolkhoz ordered a plan for the construction of a complex for the rearing of young cows. It did not order it from just anyone but from the planning institute of its own Mezkhkolkhozstroy. The institute accepted the order, received 20,000 rubles from the kolkhoz and then after a year and half reported that the ordered plan had become practically obsolete and that a decision of the collegium of the RSFSR Ministry of Agriculture took it off production. We became interested: "What about the money?" They calmly replied to us: "The money was spent. Pay again."

This is not just a special case. The same Mezhkolkhozstroy, after putting down certain prices in the planning estimated for reinforced concrete items then produced them at other prices--higher ones. Grain warehouses became higher in price by eight to ten thousand rubles, hay barns--by seven thousand... Interkolkhoz timber operations are doing the same thing: the price of pine-needle flour has been raised above the price of bread--to 22-30 kopecks per kilogram. The result is that the daughter enterprises created by kolkhozes and sovkhoses are obtaining unjustifiably high profits while their coowner bosses are carrying losses. One can excuse those directors who decline from participation in collective initiatives: to turn over timber to an interkolkhoz timber operation under the present conditions means to deprive oneself of timber. Of course, concentration and specialization provide certain advantages; the problem, however, is that farms gain nothing from these advantages.

You can see that a paradoxical situation is created: the immediate producers of agricultural products in the family of economically related partners frequently found themselves in the position of poor relatives.

The time evidently has come to rebuild the interrelations existing between the farms and those organizations which are meant to help them in the attainment of high end results.

7697

CSO: 1800/119

REGIONAL

GEORGIAN ECONOMIST VIEWS ROLE OF PRIVATE PLOTS IN SOCIALIST ECONOMY

Tbilisi ZARYA VOSTOKA in Russian 16 Oct 81 pp 2-3

[Article by R. Andguladze, candidate of economic sciences, deputy director for science at the Georgian Scientific-Research Institute of Economics and Organization of Agriculture: "Under Contractual Conditions"]

[Text] In addition to food resources an important role is assigned to private subsidiary farms of citizens under contractual conditions entering into cooperation with republic kolkhozes and sovkhoses.

The 26th party congress defined the chief tasks, ways and concrete measures for the further development of the country's agriculture. "If one speaks of agriculture as a whole," L.I. Brezhnev emphasized in his report at the congress of comrades, "it is also faced with the same chief problem that is to be found in the other sectors of the national economy--raising of efficiency and quality. We in the future shall allocate for rural localities large financial and material resources and continue the planned conversion of this sector to an industrial basis. But the center of gravity here--and this is a distinctive feature of agrarian policy in the '80s--is shifted to return on capital investment, growth of agricultural productivity and deepening and improvement of its ties with all the sectors of the agroindustrial complex."

In the long-term complex program of the most rapid possible rise of agriculture developed by the 26th CPSU Congress, a significant place is occupied by a system of measures for the further improvement of the material well-being of workers as a most important condition for the development of public production and boosting of labor productivity. This task will be solved as before primarily by a boosting of the rate of development of public production. At the same time, it is impossible not to take into account the fact that at the given stage of development of our country, an important source for the satisfaction of the constantly growing requirements of the people for food products is the private subsidiary farm, which represents a constituent part of socialist agricultural production. "The basis of socialist agriculture," it was stated at the 26th CPSU Congress by Comrade L.I. Brezhnev, "has been and continues to be kolkhozes and sovkhoses. But this does not at all mean that we should neglect the opportunities provided by private subsidiary farms. Experience attests to the fact that such farms can serve as a significant support in the production of meat, milk and certain other products. The orchards, vegetable gardens, poultry and livestock belonging to workers are a part of our total wealth."

When it comes to the nature, essence and role of the private subsidiary farm of citizens, different explanations are given and have been offered both in the recent past and today. This is principally due to the complexity of the expressed economic interrelations of this form of operation.

Some think that the private subsidiary farm is a vestige of private ownership that has ~~acquired~~ a different meaning in the epoch of socialism. In the opinion of others, an individual peasant farm has become a constituent element of the socialist economy that has lost the sense of private but yet is not part of public production or the collective farm. A third group of scholars adheres to the point of view that the private subsidiary farm is a form of small-scale individual production operated by the workers of socialist society. Its material base is far from where it would be adequate to the meaning of socialism, yet it is involved in socialist production relations.

The interests of the society of developed socialism demand a proper definition of the meaning and place of the private subsidiary farm in the system of socialist agrarian relations. Only in this case shall we be able to avoid the economically not thought out conclusions of some scholars and supervisory personnel, who in the recent past have more than once brought about unjustified restrictions relating to this form of operation and its artificial withdrawal from socialist agrarian interrelations.

True, the private subsidiary farm is not a directly constituent element of the socialist economy, corresponding to its meaning of operation, but it is a specific part of socialist public production. For today, private subsidiary farming is a necessary and most practicable form of fusion of public and individual interests. This form of operation does not have an independent social-economic mold. Its social nature determines the consideration that it functions on public land and is operated by workers employed either in public labor or in other spheres of public life. While depending on public, private farming is subsidiary in regard to basic public production and creates additional food production; it constitutes a significant source of reproduction of manpower in agriculture. It should also not be forgotten that for a number of categories of workers, pensioners, the disabled and children, the private subsidiary farm is one form of involvement in socially useful labor.

In addition to performing its chief function--the satisfaction of needs of rural residents for food products, the private subsidiary farm serves as an additional sources of marketed products for supplying the entire population. In the years of the 10th Five-Year Plan, there were sold to the state from private subsidiary farms of workers of the republic 1 million tons of grapes, 1,900,000 tons of fruits and citrus fruits, 230,000 tons of meat and many other products.

In our republic, the level of development of the private subsidiary farm has always been rather high. But to say that under these conditions the private subsidiary farm has no major resources for expanding its production, including the production of marketed products, would be wrong. Here is just one fact.

In 1979, cattle were not maintained on 37.3 percent of all the republic's households of rural inhabitants, cows and female water buffalo--44.5 percent. Here as well it can work in cooperation with the collective farm, especially in the production of animal-husbandry products.

A good example of such cooperation is shown by the farms of Abashskiy, Makharadzevskiy, Gardabanskiy, Zugdidskiy, Tsulukidzevskiy, Samtredskiy, Kaspskiy and several other rayons, where, as pointed out at the 3rd plenum of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Georgia, very good results were produced by the first steps taken in the use of the experience of the Hungarian People's Republic in the field of cooperation of public and personal farms. Comrade L. I. Brezhnev at the time of his visit to Tbilisi in May rated highly the work done along these lines in the republic. "We know," Leonid Il'ich said, "that in Georgia in recent years resources have not been used badly in increasing the production of meat and milk on private plots. The comrades said that rural inhabitants are eagerly pursuing the development of private farms. And this should continue to be promoted, naturally without letting go of attention with respect to public production."

Study of the already acquired experience of these rayons carried out by the Scientific-Research Institute of Organization of Agriculture and analysis of their operation permit the conclusion that there must be sought out in each rayon and in each concrete farm within the rayon the most optimal ways of cooperation of public and private farms most suited to local conditions. No ready-made prescriptions exist for this work. There can only be recommended several of its forms in the production of almost all agricultural products. In animal husbandry, cooperation may be carried out in the production and sale to the state of beef, pork, mutton, poultry and rabbit meat, milk and dairy products. In plant growing--in the production and sale to the state of fruits, grapes, citrus fruits (especially lemons) and vegetables in closed and open ground, potatoes and so forth. But we repeat the main thing here is to avoid blind copying, imitation--one form that could successfully be used, let us say, in one of the grape rayons, for example in Zestafonskiy or Mayakovskiy Rayon, will not produce the same effect in Gurdzhaanskiy or Telavskiy Rayon and vice versa. The only thing that can and should remain in common is that of controlling relations of the public and the private subsidiary farm as shown in a juridical document--the contract. A model form, approved by the appropriate directive organs has already been sent to all the regions and rayons of the republic.

Three forms of cooperation can be recommended in production and procurement of milk and dairy products (cheese). In the first form, the kolkhoz or sovkhos allots for maintenance to the owner of a private subsidiary farm one of its productive cows (acquired in addition to the registered number on its animal-husbandry farm) and indicates in the contract its inventory number, live weight and average yield. The cow allotted to the owner of the private subsidiary farm is listed on the balance sheet of the kolkhoz or sovkhos. In the course of the year, he is left both 50 percent of the produced milk and half of the produced offspring. In addition to this, he will be credited with 30-50 man-days and their appropriate pay for taking care of the cow.

The second form of cooperation in production and turning over of milk to the state differs from the first in that the owner of such a farm obtains from the kolkhoz or sovkhos a loan to the account of Gosbank credit for acquisition of the cow. It is paid back in 5 years beginning with the second year of obtaining the loan. At the same time, in accordance with the decree of the CPSU Central Committee and the USSR Council of Ministers "On Additional Measures for Increasing the Production of Agricultural Products on Private Subsidiary Farms of Citizens," sovkhoses and other enterprises in agreement with the trade-union committee are permitted to pay off up to 50 percent of the credit with money from the economic stimulation fund. The

owner of the subsidiary farm is committed, depending on the productivity of the cow, to turn over to the state from the farm annually 250-300 kilograms of milk or the corresponding amount of cheese at state purchase prices.

As for the third form, it differs from the first only in that the milking cow used in the cooperative effort belongs to the owner of the private farm. All the other conditions remain unchanged.

In the cooperation of public and private farms in the production of beef, two forms are recommended. The first form provides for the allotment of cattle from the public herd to the owner of a subsidiary farm for rearing and fattening and the second the use of cattle in the cooperative effort either belonging to the owner of a private farm or acquired through a loan of the farm which is again repaid in 5 years, but this time beginning with the third year after receipt of the loan. In the first case, the citizen obtains 80-85 percent of the value of the meat turned over to the state on the account of the farm and in the second--its full value at state purchase prices.

As in the case of cooperation in production and turning over to the state of milk and also in the case of cooperation in the production and turning over to the state of meat, an important place is assigned to the fodder base. Farms are recommended to allot to private subsidiary farms entering into the cooperative effort relatively flat, unworked plowland as well as 0.3-0.5 hectares of natural fodder land for the production by them the necessary amount of fodder. In the same regions (for example, in the rayons of intensive fruitgrowing, citrus raising, tea raising and viticulture), where no such possibilities exist, the provision of private subsidiary farms with both coarse and succulent fodders and combined feeds should be assumed, if not in entirety, then at least partially, by the collective farms.

When entering into cooperation in the production and sale to the state of beef and milk, the collective farms also assume other obligations: they carry out in agricultural periods and at a high qualitative level the cultivation of the allotted plots of plowland, conduct sowing of corn with their own seeds, apply fertilizer and the like to the soil, provide the private subsidiary farm with free transport and veterinary services, pay the rent in the amount of 20 rubles per year for quarters for housing cattle, take steps relating to cultivation and boosting of the productivity of pastureland and the like. A certain amount of experience in this regard has been accumulated in Nakhharadzevskiy and several other rayons of the republic.

Major opportunities exist in many rayons of the republic in increasing the production of pork. To owners of private subsidiary farms entering into cooperation, collective farms should either issue up to 80-100 kilograms of a specific number of piglets for rearing and fattening or cooperate with owners who own such head. In both instances, the collective farms provide the private subsidiary farms proper feed that is delivered at the state price and, in case of their lack, with necessary areas for their production; they also provide veterinary and transport services and so on.

That which can be provided by such cooperation is graphically illustrated in the example of Abashskiy Rayon where 1,000 tons of pork will be sold above plan to the state.

here the question may arise: where can you get enough piglets for rearing and fattening, for on many farms of the republic piglets present far from a simple problem? Obviously, the experience should be endorsed of Kolkhoz imeni Marks of Kakhati Village in Zugdidskiy Rayon and of the Krtsanisskiy Pig Raising Complex, where the following principle of cooperation has been introduced. A sow, acquired by the collective farm, is allotted to the owner of a private farm. He is also provided either with 0.3-0.5 hectares of land not being used in agricultural turnover or the necessary amount of feed. Eight to 12 piglets from each sow belong to the farm in a year (the remaining number is left to the owner of the private farm); each of the piglets at the time is reared to a weight of 20-25 kilograms. Subsequently, a part of this number is fully reared either by the collective farm or by the population that is cooperating with it.

We have major cooperation possibilities in the production and sale to the state of poultry and rabbit meat. But at the same time, it is necessary to especially emphasize that the help provided to private subsidiary farms through allocation to them of head of cattle, poultry and the like must in no way interfere with the full development of the capacities of animal-husbandry farms. Quite the contrary, the development of these capacities must have first priority.

Many of the above presented forms of cooperation can also be introduced into plant growing--viticulture, fruit cultivation, citrus growing, vegetable growing in open and closed ground. But it must be clearly understood that the contract loses force in all cases of cooperation if an able-bodied kolkhoz member (sovkhoz worker) or an able-bodied member of his family keeps away from collective useful labor.

The private subsidiary farm of kolkhoz members of sovkhoz workers is connected by many links with the collective farm; it depends on it and is due to it. It is therefore considered advisable to have on the staff of large, economically strong farms a special unit of the deputy, while economically weak farms should have this job handled by existing staff units. There is evidently required special accounting of the products produced through cooperation with private subsidiary farms.... The scale of the tasks facing kolkhozes and sovkhozes should not belittle the importance of the private farm, the resources of which should be fully utilized in the interest of the present and future development of agricultural production and fuller satisfaction of the needs of workers for high-quality food products.

7697

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REGIONAL

UKRAINIAN CP NOVEMBER PLENUM RESOLUTIONS

Kiev PRAVDA UKRAINY in Russian 26 Nov 81 pp 1-2

[Decree issued by November Plenum of CP Uk Central Committee "On the Duties of the Republic Party Organization in Carrying Out the Decisions of the November (1981) Plenum of the CPSU Central Committee and the Directives Set Forth in Comrade L. I. Brezhnev's Speech at the Plenum"]

[Excerpts] Communists and all working people in the Ukrainian SSR responded to the decisions of the CPSU Central Committee Plenum with great satisfaction and approval.

Socialist competition for heightened production efficiency and the use of all reserves for the successful attainment of five-year-plan objectives has been launched in the republic on a broad scale. The plans for the first 10 months of this year for the sale of industrial products and the augmentation of labor productivity were fulfilled.

Existing national economic reserves and possibilities are still not being used fully, however. Some enterprises, construction organizations, kolkhozes and sovkhozes did not complete their assignments. There was a higher number of lagging enterprises in the networks of the Ukrainian SSR Ministry of the Construction Materials Industry, Ministry of the Timber and Wood Processing Industry and Ministry of the Meat and Dairy Industry and in Donetskaya, Voroshilovgradskaya, Zhitomirskaya, Khersonskaya, Dnepropetrovskaya and Kirovogradskaya oblasts. In some branches, production capacities are not being completed and incorporated on schedule, the return on capital has decreased, overhead cost and profit assignments are not being completed, the material requirements of production and the percentage of manual labor are still too high, and the necessary persistence is not displayed in the incorporation of scientific and technical achievements, new progressive technology and advanced experience. Reclaimed lands, fertilizer, equipment and fodder resources are not being utilized efficiently on a number of farms and in some rayons and the productivity of animal husbandry is low.

The CP Uk Central Committee Plenum believes that one of the main reasons is that the move to primarily intensive factors of economic growth and the reorganization of the style of management and methods of planning and administration are still progressing too slowly in some areas. Significant errors in the management of subordinate branches have been committed by, in particular, the Ukrainian SSR ministries of the coal industry, ferrous metallurgy, light industry, local industry, the

construction materials industry, agriculture and trade. Some party obkoms, gorkoms, raykoms and primary party organizations do not demand enough from economic managers in matters regarding the strict observance of state discipline, the fulfillment of plan assignments and the compliance with party decisions.

The November (1981) CPSU Central Committee Plenum stressed that the accomplishment of the massive and intense work of the five-year plan will require redoubled and retripled effort in each area of economic construction, the quicker reorganization of operational methods and style and the even more persistent intensification of national production.

The plenum of the Central Committee of the Ukrainian Communist Party hereby decrees:

That the compilation and implementation of a food program must be assigned top priority by the CPUk Central Committee, the Ukrainian SSR Council of Ministers, party and soviet organs and republic ministries and departments. The resolution of the food problem should be the aim of the development of all links of the agro-industrial complex--agriculture, the industrial branches serving it and the systems for the procurement, storage, processing, shipment and sale of products. All opportunities to supplement food resources must be utilized in full. The fodder base must be reinforced and the productivity of animal husbandry must be heightened.

The Ukrainian SSR Council of Ministers, concerned ministries and departments, party, soviet and economic organs and trade-union and Komsomol organizations must take steps to radically improve the work of enterprises in the coal industry and ferrous metallurgy, speed up the augmentation of nuclear power engineering capacities, ensure the strictest conservation of fuel and energy resources and guarantee the widespread use of energy-saving equipment and technology.

The Ukrainian SSR Gosplan, ministries and departments, ispolkoms of oblast soviets and the Kiev City Soviet of People's Deputies and party obkoms, gorkoms and raykoms must consistently strive for the concentration of capital investments, forces and material resources for the completion of major national economic projects on schedule--nuclear power stations, main gaslines, capacities in the coal industry, ferrous metallurgy and agricultural machine building, enterprises connected with consumer goods manufacture, housing, schools, pre-school establishments, hospitals and polyclinics. The production base of construction must be thoroughly developed and reinforced.

The heads of ministries and departments, railways and shipping lines, enterprises and associations must ensure radical improvement in the work of all types of transport, especially the railroads, focusing primarily on the acceleration of drayage operations, the loading and unloading of railway cars, motor vehicles and ships and the delivery of fuel, raw materials, food, fodder for animal husbandry and other extremely important freight on schedule.

The CPUk Central Committee Plenum believes that one of the important duties of party, soviet, economic and trade-union organizations consists in carrying out the measures specified by the CPSU Central Committee and USSR Council of Ministers for the improvement of economic planning and management, administrative style and

methods and the structure of the administrative system, the reduction of this system and the reinforcement of state plan discipline.

Existing opportunities for the acceleration of technological progress, the augmentation of labor productivity and the return on capital, and the dramatic reduction of manual labor by means of the comprehensive mechanization and automation of production processes must be utilized in full. Scientific research, project planning and design organizations must play a greater role in this process and strive to make their work more productive.

Party obkoms, gorkoms and raykoms and primary party organizations must raise the standards of organizational work in the area of economic construction, considerably increase their influence in the sphere of economic management, make more efficient use of party control in all links of production and management and persistently and purposefully defend statewide interests. They must conduct a well-planned and exacting personnel policy so that all areas of work are headed by politically mature and competent individuals, capable of putting the tremendous potential of the socialist economy to work and ensuring the completion of five-year-plan assignments.

Higher demands must be made on personnel and on their responsibility so that each administrator and each worker can make correct and discerning evaluations of his own work and its results, notice shortcomings before it is too late and correct them, and so that each communist devotes all of his effort, experience and knowledge to the improvement of conditions and sets the proper example of selfless labor.

The foreign policy activity of our party and state and the new major initiatives of the CPSU Central Committee and Soviet Government in the international arena must be thoroughly and clearly publicized, all of the intrigues of hostile propaganda must be resolutely repulsed and the political vigilance of Soviet people must be enhanced.

With a view to the new objectives of economic and social development, the peculiarities of the present international situation and the exacerbation of the ideological struggle in the world, we must strive for more vigorous, efficient and effective party organizational and ideological work so that people can be readily mobilized, will be prepared to overcome difficulties and will be able to assess current events correctly and draw the necessary practical conclusions from these assessments.

8588

CSO: 1800/130

REGIONAL

AUTHORITY OF GEORGIAN SOVIETS MUST BE UPHELD

[Editorial Report] Tbilisi KOMUNISTI in Georgian on 12 November has an 1100-word front-page editorial on the need to uphold and enhance the authority of the local Soviets of People's Deputies, as spelled out in the new 1977 constitution. The editorial refers generally to pluses and minuses in the performance of the Tbilisi soviets, and sketches briefly the workings of the Kutaisi City Soviet, which has an effective monitoring system, and the Rustavi City Soviet, which has instituted a system by which all acts and projects are meticulously checked to ensure conformity to the law.

6054

CSO: 1813/711

'LAW AND ORDER' PLANNING PROPOSED BY GEORGIAN LEGAL EXPERT

[Editorial Report] Tbilisi KOMUNISTI in Georgian on 13 November page 3 under the periodic current rubric "Prior to the GCP CC Plenum" carries an 1100-word piece by Juridical Sciences Candidate Dzh. Khetsuriani, an instructor in the Kutaisi Gorkom, on the need to apply scientific methods to the planning and implementation of long-term (medium-range) law and order measures on a regional basis. He calls for a special law and order section within regional social-economic development plans, and urges the use of statistics for mapping regional crime patterns, dynamics, types, causes, categories of perpetrators (first-timers, recidivists, those shunning socially useful labor), factors such as the region's industrial level and demography, and so on. On the basis of such chartings, reliable and effective forecasting can be done over medium-range periods. He also urges that jurists be added to the relevant inter-rayon departments of the Scientific-Research Institute for Economics and Planning of the National Economy (under Gosplan).

6054

CSO: 1813/711

GEORGIAN LABOR LAWS MUST BE ENFORCED

[Editorial Report] Tbilisi KOMUNISTI in Georgian on 4 November page 2 carries a 900-word piece by G. Iosava, head of the GSSR Trade Union Council's Juridical Consultation Department, on the need to enforce labor laws more effectively. He cites a number of instances where officials and managers fired personnel illegally on various grounds, usually without the consent of the trade union unit, either in ignorance or willful disregard of the law. A high percentage of such firings are overturned by the courts. In some cases, the trade union units themselves give their consent wrongfully, generally out of ignorance. Criminal Code passages dealing specifically with these matters and calling for strict punishment of the responsible officials--including dismissal or imprisonment--are all too rarely applied. The article ends with a brief quote by Shevardnadze on the subject.

6054

CSO: 1813/711

WORK OF GEORGIAN LANGUAGE NORMS COMMISSION DISCUSSED

[Editorial Report] Tbilisi KOMUNISTI in Georgian on 1 November page 2 under the rubric "O Mother Language!" carries a 2000-word Gruzinform interview with Zurab A. Pataridze, chairman of the GSSR Council of Ministers and also chairman of the Permanent State Commission for Setting the Norms of the Modern Georgian Literary Language, concerning the commission's efforts in recent years, in particular since the joint GCP CC and Council of Ministers decree on improving the instruction of Georgian language and literature. He describes the commission's measures to study and decide on matters of vocabulary, morphology, syntax, orthography; literary, advertising, radio, and TV usage; the preparation of dictionaries, manuals, and textbooks; and so on. The commission itself publishes periodic collections of articles on particular linguistic norm problems, and is preparing a second volume setting forth the principles of determining grammatical usage. A second edition of the orthographic dictionary is ready, and specialized glossaries of foreign personal and geographic name spellings are in preparation. Radio and TV "Language Purity" features are broadcast, and rubrics of that sort have been or are to be introduced in the newspapers and journals. Editors in all the media are convened regularly for discussion and instruction.

6054

CSO: 1813/711

HISTORY, CULTURE, DEVELOPMENT OF GEORGIA'S SVANETIA FEATURED

[Editorial Report] Tbilisi KOMUNISTI in Georgian on 5 December devotes most of page 2 and all of page 3 to special feature articles on mountainous Mestia

Rayon, the heart of Svanetia--its ancient and recent history, culture, economic progress and development, its people, crafts, and demography.

The main article is a 3100-word piece by Prof Grigol Margiani. Svanetia (Mestia Rayon) shares many of the characteristics and problems of Georgia's mountain districts. In particular, for years "in the recent past" it suffered from the neglect and bad policies of the leadership of that time. Thanks to the new leadership, the region has been revived. People are returning, the economy is developing apace, the new road from Zugdidi to Mestia has ended centuries of cultural and social isolation, and schools, industrial, farm and tourist facilities, and housing are being built. Nevertheless, there are factors that need to be controlled to ensure that Svanetia is a producing, not merely a consuming, district. For one thing, too many of the able-bodied population still seek employment and opportunity elsewhere, including outside of Georgia.

Professor Margiani then dwells on some circumstances hinting at the people's discontent with their lack of jurisdictional authority. For example, the Khudoni GES now under construction and designed to be the second largest hydro-power complex in Georgia after the recently completed Inguri GES at Dzhvari is actually 34 km from Khudoni but just a few kilometers from the Svanetian town of Khaishi. Official efforts to get the name changed are stymied by the fact that Khudoni is the name given in all the official documents from the beginning. Next, authority over Mestia Rayon's forestry and timber operations has been headquartered for 17 years in the neighboring Tsalendzhikha Rayon despite Svanetian leaders' promises to bring it back home. The situation dates from 1962, when logging and timber operations were halted in Mestia for environmental reasons, then resumed later by the Timber and Woodworking Industry Ministry but with jurisdiction transferred to Tsalendzhikha. Professor Margiani attributes this to "those who claimed" that Mestia was incapable of fulfilling production plans. Under the present jurisdictional set-up, however, official output is way down compared with 1962, yet large-scale illegal logging operations, which also pose the threat of colossal erosion and environmental damage, are practically out of control.

On other topics, Professor Margiani deplores the fact that many of Svanetia's wealth of cultural monuments and art treasures (more of them have been preserved in Mestia Rayon than anywhere else) still suffer from neglect and inadequate facilities. As for the Svan people's place in history, he decries the "falsification, distortion, and artificial archaization" of Svanetia's culture and social structure, started by historians writing in the 19th century and still cropping up to this day--in particular, claims that the Svans still lived and governed themselves in primitive clan/tribal groupings, a "concoction" which noted historian Niko Berdzenishvili himself renounced late in his life.

Finally, the author discusses at length the problem of sorting out positive from harmful customs and traditions--the latter including centuries-old practices of clan blood feuds and bride-kidnapping (also wife-stealing). Nevertheless, the main worry today is posed by harmful "traditions" that have taken hold in recent times, such as excessively lavish weddings and funerals, graft, and corruption, fostered by "some officials."

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